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iAbstract
A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its suspicion that lower 
courts and state and local administrative agencies are systematically ignoring constitutional rules 
intended to limit, through heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool.  
Exactions are the concessions local governments require of property owners as conditions for the 
issuance of the entitlements that enable the intensified use of real property.  In two cases decided 
over the past two decades, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard (1994), the Court has established under the Takings Clause a logic and metrics for 
constitutionally permissible exactions that requires concessions to have an “essential nexus” and 
be “roughly proportional” to the harms a proposed development is expected to cause.  This 
Article argues that the Court’s  suspicions are well-founded, but that blame for judicial and
administrative non-compliance lies with the Court itself.  
The Supreme Court’s efforts in Nollan and Dolan to establish doctrinal clarity in the 
individualized, local land use regulatory process have not, and cannot, achieve their goals of 
securely protecting property rights and discipline regulatory practices.  What the Article 
describes as the Court’s takings formalism fails to constrain regulatory practices in their intended 
way, and results in constraints on the variable, locally situated, and intensely political context of 
local governance.  These constraints, which include incentives for local governments to develop 
preconstituted regulatory formulas and disincentives against individualized, negotiated 
concessions, often promote neither the Court’s preferred normative vision of strong property 
rights protection nor the Court’s stated secondary concern for better, more efficient land use 
regulation.  Most perniciously, the Court’s limited doctrinal, normative, and utilitarian visions of 
takings law may block and damage the essential political and social processes necessary to 
legitimate and functional local governance.
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1Introduction
In a recent dissent from a denial of a petition for certiorari, Justice Scalia announced his 
suspicion that state and lower federal courts are systematically ignoring or misapplying the 
Supreme Court’s takings decisions.1  His frustration emanated in part from what he saw as lower 
courts’ willful or negligent confusion about the bifurcated structure of contemporary regulatory 
takings law.2  The general default takings standard that applies to most takings claims (one 
associated most closely with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York) employs a 
relatively low level of scrutiny and balances a number of factors in an ad hoc, open-ended 
inquiry.3  Contrasting this default approach, takings claims that fall within a limited number of 
exceptional, identifiable categories receive a form of heightened scrutiny, one which limits 
judicial discretion and favors the protection of property rights through clear, narrow rules of 
decision.4  Justice Scalia expressed two concerns regarding the tension between “categorical” 
takings rules and the default approach to takings:  first, that courts misapply or refuse to apply 
the clear dictates of categorical takings rules and instead merely apply the less precise and more 
deferential Penn Central standard; and second, that in doing so, lower courts dissipate 
1 See Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 (Cal.App. 1997), review granted, 71 
Cal.Rptr.2d 215 (1998), appeal dismissed, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1549, 1551-52 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Joining Justice Scalia in his dissent were Justices Kennedy and Thomas.  Some 
commentators have made similar complaints.   See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and 
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 492 (1995) (“One of the reasons for Dolan was the hostile response to the lower 
courts in Nollan.”); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings 
Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL L. J.  523, 555-56 (1995) 
(tracking state and lower federal courts’ tendency to ignore or blunt the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan, Dolan, 
and Lucas).  The Takings Clause appears in the Fifth Amendment, and provides:  “... nor shall private property be 
taken for public use without just compensation.”  Its application extends to state and federal government.  See B. & 
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897).
2 Lambert, 120 S.Ct. at 1551.
3 See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  Following the lead of courts 
and commentators, I will refer to this as the Penn Central test.
4 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-26 (2002); 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). The most prominent of these categorical exceptions from Penn 
Central’s balancing test is for regulatory acts denying all economically beneficial or productive use of land, which, 
the Court held in a decision authored by Justice Scalia, are “compensable without case-specific inquiry.”  Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
2constitutional protections for property owners and thus dilute the conception of broad and stable 
property rights Scalia and his dissenting colleagues thought the Court had firmly established.
The case that raised the justices’ suspicion, Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 
involved a California intermediate appellate court’s refusal to apply the heightened scrutiny of 
one of the categorical exceptions to the Penn Central approach,5 which the Court had developed 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission6 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.7 Nollan and Dolan
concerned the judicial review of “exactions,” the concessions local governments require of 
property owners as conditions for the issuance of entitlements that enable the intensified use of 
real property.8  The majorities in those decisions declared two rule-like commands:  any 
exactions required as conditions for an approval to intensify the use of property must both 
demonstrate an “essential nexus”9 and be in “rough proportionality”10 to the expected harms that 
the new use would cause.  Though somewhat inexact, these commands require that judicial 
review perform a more probing inquiry into exactions than the state courts had in Nollan and 
Dolan.  This inquiry would identify and classify as takings what the Court believed were flawed 
local land use regulatory practices that result in extortionate demands of besieged property 
owners than conducted.  Justice Scalia’s frustration with the state court’s decision in Lambert
(and presumably untold numbers of similar lower court decisions), then, relates first to what he 
perceived as the failure of lower courts to apply Nollan and Dolan’s rule-like commands 
5
 The specific issue that concerned Justice Scalia in Lambert was whether the categorical exception to Penn Central
developed in Nollan and Dolan applied to exactions offered by a local government and rejected by a property owner, 
where there is evidence that the owner’s rejection was a cause of the government’s ultimate denial of a necessary 
entitlement for development.  See Lambert, 120 S.Ct. at 1550.  For a fuller discussion of the particularities of the 
disputed issue in Lambert, see infra note 89.
6
 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
7
 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
10 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
3correctly and second to his perception that local governments have continued to use exactions to 
expropriate or threaten to expropriate private property.    
This Article concerns the Court’s efforts in Nollan and Dolan to constrain judicial and 
local government discretion through a constitutional rule-formalism,11 and to impose this formal 
discipline on the unruly, disparate practices of local land use regulation.  It argues that the 
Court’s efforts to establish doctrinal clarity—resulting in what Frank Michelman has called 
“judicial devices for putting some kind of stop to the denaturalization and disintegration of 
property”12— have not, and cannot, achieve their goals of securely protecting property rights and 
disciplining regulatory practices.  Moreover, the Article argues, the Court’s efforts have had 
complicated, often unintended consequences insofar as they limit the political and social 
dynamics essential to legitimate and effective local land use regulation.  In short, the Court’s 
constitutional rules for exactions fail to constrain regulatory practices in their intended way, and 
result in largely unfortunate constraints on the variable, locally situated, and intensely political 
context of local governance.  In making this argument, the Article extends existing commentary 
on Nollan and Dolan,13 and connects that literature to larger debates regarding rule-formalism 
and vagueness in takings law generally.14
11
 The term “formalism” has a variety of jurisprudential and historical meanings, invoking such diverse schools as 
classical Langedellian conceptualism and constitutional textualism.  My use of the term is quite specific, however.  
By “rule-formalism” I mean a commitment imposing, in the relevant context of this Article, highly predictive rule-
or principle-bound constitutional common law commands in order to limit judicial discretion.  See generally
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983) (distinguishing between classical legal 
conceptions of formalism and conceptualism).  This approach correlates with, but is not necessarily tied to, other 
meanings of the term formalism. See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999); Frank 
I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999).  When I use the 
term “formalism” throughout this Article, I mean rule-formalism.
12
 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988); see also Margaret Jane Radin, 
Diagnosing the Takings Problem,  33 NOMOS  248, 264-66 (1991) (describing desire within liberal ideal of the Rule 
of Law for stable and understandable general rules).
13
 The most prominent critiques of Nollan and Dolan’s logic and consequences are WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 341-51 (1995); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on 
Land Use Exactions:  Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1989); David 
4The first three Parts of this Article explain the relationship among exactions, takings 
formalism, and regulatory formulas.  Exactions, as Part I explains, are individualized means to 
resolve contested issues about proposed development within the variable, locally situated content 
of land use decisions.  Part II characterizes the Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan as the 
result of broader efforts by an occasional majority of the Court to establish far-reaching, 
formalist rules that would provide stronger property protection and require administrative 
precision of agencies that regulate land use.  Nollan and Dolan have had some discernible effects 
on land use regulatory practices, which Part III describes.  Most significantly, the decisions have 
contributed to local governments’ abandonment of individualized negotiations with property 
owners over exactions, and have prompted them to favor instead legislative and often formulaic 
approaches to calculating and imposing exactions.  
In all, the Court’s efforts have had diverse effects on jurisdictions’ ability and willingness 
to require property owners to agree to exactions that internalize the external costs of 
development.  Part IV argues that the Court’s constitutional rule-formalism and the resulting 
formulaic administrative approach do not, in many instances, actually further the Court’s stated 
goals of protecting individual property rights and forcing efficient regulation.  In fact, they are 
likely to result in the widespread underregulation and occasional overregulation of land use.  
Equally important, Part V claims, the Court’s takings formalism has encouraged regulatory 
formulas at the expense of individualized, alternative means for resolving contested disputes 
over the expected costs of new development.  These alternative means—including open, 
contentious political battles and non-judicial methods of resolving them—are often quite messy.  
A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); and Lee Ann 
Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
14
 For a recent thorough review and reconsideration of that literature, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness 
in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
5But enabling and resolving political disputes are frequently essential ways to arrive at legitimate, 
effective decisions within the disparate local contexts of land use regulation.  The politics of land 
use disputes, in sum, are constituent elements of legitimate, effective local governance, and 
judicial efforts to remove politics from land use are doomed to disappoint their proponents.
The Article argues ultimately that while the Court’s concerns about individual property 
rights and extortionate regulations are not entirely misplaced, they fail to consider the varied and 
complicated situations of local governance and the competing visions of property within which 
land use disputes emerge. 15  To the extent that a universal, formal clarity for land use law can 
even be achieved—an assumption that this article implicitly disputes—such clarity can only be 
imposed at great expense.  In cases like Lambert, then, lower courts and state and local 
legislatures may not be engaged in the ideological struggle that Justice Scalia seems to assume 
causes their resistance to the Court’s commands.  Rather, they may be struggling to find 
acceptable resolutions to the complicated, locally situated, political land use conflicts that the 
Court’s relatively blunt instruments fail to achieve.
I. Land Use Bargaining and Exactions Practice.
A. The Flexibility of Contemporary Land Use Regulation.
Since 1926, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the practice constitutionally 
permissible, a municipality has been able to utilize its police powers to utilize zoning regulations 
within its jurisdiction in order to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare.16
Zoning’s early availability as a constitutionally permissible land use tool led to its widespread 
15
 In this sense, the Article is an effort to use as critique and offer as alternatives competing rhetorical modes of 
understanding property from the limited approaches on which the Court relies.  See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of 
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1998).
16 See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926).
6adoption by local governments,17 and all fifty states now either require or enable their 
municipalities to perform some level of comprehensive planning.18  Consistent with the 
municipality’s comprehensive or general plan,19 the zoning ordinance and map define, with 
variable specificity, the generally permissible land uses on specific parcels within the 
jurisdiction.20  At its inception and during its early implementation, American zoning theory 
proceeded from a series of presumptions that compromised what has been referred to as 
“Euclidean” zoning.21  This approach strictly separates different types of land uses in discrete 
zones, identifies uses within zones as early as possible in the development of a jurisdiction, and 
keeps zoning designations stable over time, allowing only slight variances rarely and on a parcel-
by-parcel basis.22  Euclidean zoning’s formal, geographic conception of urban and suburban 
development established, for long periods and with limited flexibility, the rules of land use 
within a jurisdiction.
The static, inflexible Euclidean model began to break down after World War II, due in 
particular to suburban development and to the vast social and economic changes wrought by 
17
 Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1434-35 (1978).  
18 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 1.01 (5th ed. 2003); see generally Eric H. Steel, Participation and 
Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (speculating that zoning’s persistence as a 
regulatory practice can be traced to the “widespread, if unarticulated, perception that the institution is serving some 
vital social function”).
19
 In contemporary land use and planning practice, a municipality’s zoning ordinance works as a second-level 
regulation beneath the constitution-like comprehensive or master plan, which attempts to guide future land use 
development within the jurisdiction.  See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 3.01.
20 See “Zoning,” “Zoning Code,” and “Zoning Map,” in A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING 
TERMS 260-61 (Fay Dolnick & Michael Davidson eds., American Planning Association Planning Advisory Service 
Report No. 491/492, 1999) [hereinafter A GLOSSARY OF ZONING]. 
21 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 104 (2nd ed. 2000).  
The term refers to the municipal defendant in the 1926 Supreme Court decision declaring zoning to be 
constitutionally permissible.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22 See Ira Michael Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URB. L. 2 (1973), reprinted in THE 
LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 51 (Robert H. Freilich & Eric O. Stuhler eds., 1981); 
“Euclidean zoning,” in A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, supra note 20, at 94.  Euclidean zoning’s appeal to early zoning 
advocates and early adopting local governments was both economic and social: zoning promised to protect property 
values by settling and enforcing expectations that land uses would be stable and segregated, and similarly secured 
segregation of residential neighborhoods by class and race.   See RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE 
CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 1920S 224-25 (1986).
7postwar growth.23  Especially in the past quarter-century, planning theory and land use law have 
evolved into a relatively flexible regulatory model, one more reactive to changes in market 
demand and regulatory need.24  Local governments adapt to changing patterns in commercial, 
industrial, and residential uses by allowing piecemeal amendments as well as wholesale revisions 
or redraftings of their comprehensive plan.25  Increasingly, municipalities have come to treat 
their comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and maps, subdivision ordinances, and issuance of 
variances less as components of a permanent, fixed scheme and more as a fluid set of parameters 
within which they establish contractual or conditional relationships with property owners seeking 
to change the use of their property.26  It is within this context that local governments have 
developed the practice of “exacting” concessions from property owners.
B. Exactions Bargaining.
In order to make significant changes to the existing use of their land—changes like 
subdividing parcels, initiating major construction projects, or shifting the type of use from 
residential to commercial or to more intense residential or commercial uses—property owners 
typically must seek one or more discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction’s zoning authority 
or legislative body.27  Local governments reach their decision to approve or deny development 
23 See MICHAEL J. MESHENBERG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES 3 (American Society of 
Planning Officials Planning Advisory Service Report No. 318, 1976); Edward J. Kaiser & David R. Godschalk, 
Twentieth Century Land Use Planning: A Stalwart Family Tree, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 365, 372-73 (1995).
24 See MESHENBERG, supra note 23, at 3-4; Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as 
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 879-80 (1983).
25 See generally PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS & 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 162-75 (1998) (describing numerous “innovative land use controls” 
developed as responses to the rigidity of Euclidean zoning).  
26 See IRVING SCHIFFMAN, ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING GROWTH 2-4 (1999).
27 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., How the West Was Won: Takings and Exactions—California Style, in TRENDS IN LAND 
USE LAW FROM A TO Z, 193, 225-26 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001). Such approvals take many forms, including the 
permit to redevelop with the conditions that the City of Tigard granted and the variances from the conditions 
imposed by the Community Development Code that Tigard denied in Dolan, as well as the coastal development 
permit that the California Coastal Commission granted, with conditions, in Nollan.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377-80; 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29. 
8proposals after considering a specific project proposed for a particular piece of land.28  In this 
process, local governments and property owners often negotiate over the concessions that an 
applicant will agree to as the condition for issuance of the approval necessary to change the 
existing land use on the subject parcel.  State courts, which early on tended to condemn flexible, 
negotiated land use regulatory practices as impermissible efforts by municipalities to contract 
away their police powers, 29 have increasingly upheld such agreements, especially when states 
have granted the municipalities authority to do so. 30
Exactions are a type of conditional zoning by which local governments, as a condition for 
issuing a discretionary approval for development of land, require property owners and/or 
developers to finance or provide public facilities.31  The typical exaction requires that in 
exchange for the required regulatory approval by the local government for a proposed new land 
use, the property owner provides or pays for some concession or package of concessions based 
on the anticipated impacts of the proposed new land use and the actions (to be provided either by 
the landowner or the local government) required to mitigate those impacts.  Such concessions 
may include dedication of land for the siting of public services or amenities (such as schools or 
parks), fees in lieu of dedication, and impact fees to fund the provision of public services.32
28 ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
LAND USE EXACTIONS 54-55 (1993).
29 See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 5.01 (1987); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward 
the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government 
Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 1007 (1987).
30 See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 9.11; DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 162-
65 (1999).  Many states authorize the imposition of concessions in exchange for regulatory approvals.  See, e.g., 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66000 (West 2003) (California’s Mitigation Fee Act, authorizing imposition of impact fees); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-133(4)(a) (2003) (authorizing dedications and in-lieu fees for park and school sites); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West 2003) (authorizing exactions for off-site improvements “necessitated or required”
by a subdivision seeking approval).
31 See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 30, at 161-63.  
32 See New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. Mayor of Bernards Township, 528 A.2d. 555, 558-59 (1987); Been, supra  note 
13, at 475-76 (1989); Thomas W. Ledman, Local Governmental Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development 
Exactions, The Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 842-53 (1993).  Another type of exaction is the “linkage,” an 
9Exactions require financial or in- kind provision of needed or desired infrastructure; as such they 
shape the physical environment, generate revenue, force the internalization of external costs 
where private ordering is unlikely to do so, and resolve political conflict.33  Given the variety of 
ends they promise to meet and their role in shaping the conditions for development, exactions are 
fraught with political, legal, and emotional controversy not only for landowners, but also for 
other affected parties (including neighbors, interest groups, and residents of the jurisdiction and, 
possibly, region) and the regulatory agency itself.
Two parallel developments in municipal finance explain local governments’ increased 
reliance on exactions to provide infrastructure.  First, local governments face enormous fiscal 
constraints from the combination of federal funding cuts, state and federal mandates regarding 
the extent and quality of public infrastructure provision, and financial restraints on municipalities 
resulting brought on by the anti-tax revolt of the late-1970s and 1980s.34  And at the same time, 
local governments across the country suffer from an infrastructural deficit.35  By financing 
infrastructural improvements, exactions help address this problem.  Second, exactions respond to 
the concern shared by regulators and the public that the external costs of new development 
off-site development impact exactions intended to address effects linked to an approved development, such as the 
increased need for affordable housing that might result from commercial and/or office development.  See Theodore 
C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer’s Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524 
(1988).
33 ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 7; ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 286 
(2000).
34 See Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW. 541, 542-43 (1994);
reprinted in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA 87, (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995); ALTSHULER & 
GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 23-26; Paul P. Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics of Development 
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 43, 44 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987); Louis F. 
Wechsler et al., Politics and Administration of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra, at 15, 
34-36.
35 See Deborah Rhoads, Developer Exactions and Public Decision Making in the United States and England, 11 
ARIZ.. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 472 (1994); R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to 
Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-6 (Winter 1987); Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development 
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 34, at 70, 73.
10
should not be passed on to surrounding landowners, the existing infrastructure, state and local 
government treasuries, and the environment.  By ordinance or by individualized, ad hoc decision, 
a jurisdiction may require that a property owner and/or developer who seeks discretionary 
approval for an entitlement to intensify land use make monetary or non-financial concessions 
that will at minimum remedy the proposed project’s anticipated negative impacts.36
C. Exactions as a Flexible Tool for Land Use Bargaining.
Although alternatives to exactions exist, they are unlikely either to be as financially 
effective or as politically palatable as imposing exactions.37  Accordingly, local governments 
faced with a controversial and potentially costly approval may simply deny the applications, seek 
assistance from similarly cast-strapped state and federal governments, raise general revenues 
through property taxation, or allow their infrastructure to deteriorate.38  Because of the practical 
or political improbability of all these options except denial, a local government’s choice is most 
often between denial or approval with exactions.  When a property owner seeks additional rights 
to engage in a more intensive and valuable use of her land, exactions enable the property owner 
and local government to trade critical entitlements and achieve a mutually advantageous end by 
avoiding the denial option.39  In this sense, exactions can enable growth both by funding 
necessary infrastructure and by fending off anti-growth sentiment; at the same time, they can 
36 See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 62-63, 77, 95-96.  On the extent to which exactions 
requiring property owners to perform duties and pay fees to cover the anticipated impacts of rezoning, see James C. 
Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88 
(Winter 1987). 
37
 Such other, generally less attractive means include ad valorem property taxes, see Downing & McCaleb, supra
note 34, at 49-50; special assessments, see ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 17; required subdivision 
improvements, see Smith, supra note 29, at 6; user fees, see JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 
TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES at xix (1991); and the common law of nuisance, see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and 
Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 
341 (2002).
38 ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 2-3.
39 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 21-26.
11
also limit growth by requiring expensive, and perhaps prohibitive, concessions from 
developers.40
Consider a few admittedly simplistic hypotheticals.  In the first, a local government 
chooses between (1) the legally permissible denial of an application for an entitlement to develop 
land, and (2) an approval of that entitlement conditioned upon the property owner’s mitigation of 
the project’s impacts that it thinks will not internalize fully the costs of the development.  Here, 
the rational local government will deny the entitlement.  By contrast, consider a second 
hypothetical local government faced with an option (2) that would enable it to require or accept 
an offset that at least internalizes all costs and may even benefit its constituents or its treasury.  
Bargains like this may provide the property owner with a significantly better result than an 
outright denial, but may also provide benefits to—and will at least not push costs onto— the 
jurisdiction and its residents.41
Considered this way, exactions may appear allocatively efficient by forcing property 
owners to bear the costs of the impacts of the development of their land.42  However, they can 
also be inequitable as well as expensive and uncertain to administer.  For example, they can 
constitute a regressive form of redistribution that discriminates against newcomers and renters by 
raising the cost of new housing.43  In addition, they rely upon estimates of the costs and harms of 
development, which can be difficult to ascertain, evaluate, and remediate and which can 
therefore lead to imprecise and potentially inaccurate and inefficient assumptions about the terms 
40
 Elizabeth A. Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL 
ESTATE EXACTIONS, LINKAGE, AND ALTERNATIVE LAND POLICIES 96, 98-103 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988).
41 COOTER, supra note 33, at 299-302.
42 See THOMAS J. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS:  AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 55-59 (1996).  Conditions on development that generate greater social benefits than 
total social costs efficiently allocate costs and benefits.  See Dana, supra note 13, at 1247.
43 ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 134-36.
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of the resulting bargain.44  Their flexibility can lead to wide disparities in the types and extent of 
exactions required of property owners in the same jurisdiction, sometimes because of favoritism 
for or discrimination against particular property owners or sometimes because of regulatory 
changes over time.  Exactions can also vary widely in and across jurisdictions due to political, 
market, environmental, and competitive differences among cities and counties (and at times in 
the same jurisdiction).  In communities seeking to protect or enhance especially attractive but 
fragile resources (beaches and mountains or proximity thereto, for example), the concessions 
required from property owners seeking discretionary approvals are likely to be greater; and the 
same is likely the case in jurisdictions that are at or near build-out and are suffering from 
infrastructure deficits that they wish at least to hold steady, if not reverse, and where local 
majorities are able to wield political power to exclude newcomers through exclusionary zoning.45
By contrast, concessions are likely to be smaller in jurisdictions that for political or financial 
reasons wish to attract development, and that are willing to ignore or knowingly bear the costs of 
that development’s impact.46
In sum, exactions vary, and their great strength as a tool for governance—providing 
flexibility to solve otherwise intractable regulatory blockages that would result in denials—is 
also their greatest liability, rendering them neither a precise nor predictable regulatory tool.47
Nevertheless, when used effectively and based upon relatively complete information about a 
44 See infra Part IV.A.
45 See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground:  How the Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence 
Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 128-30 (2001); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition 
Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834-35 (1992).
46 See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45, at 128-30; Sterk, supra note 45, at 859.
47
 Empirical studies demonstrate the variability of effects that impact fees have on land values and new and existing 
housing prices.  See MARLA DRESH & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, WHO PAYS FOR DEVELOPMENT FEES AND EXACTIONS?
25-26 (1997); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Timothy M. Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact 
Fees on Housing and Land Markets, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Papers # CP02A13, at 15-16 (July 
2002) (visited July 21, 2003) <http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=563>.
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proposed land use and its likely impacts, exactions appear to be the best available regulatory tool 
within the modern, flexible land use regulatory framework for forcing the internalization of 
external costs.  “Best” in this context does not necessarily mean effective or even especially 
good,48 but rather best available.49  But exactions at least evoke and theoretically enable a 
roughly equitable, roughly efficient solution to the recurring problem of the future harms and 
external costs attributable to the increased intensity of land use.  Moreover, to the extent that 
parties affected by the new land use have some say in the process by which concessions are 
identified and calculated, exactions at least create the conditions for a regulatory process by 
which the issuance of approvals for new development can be inclusive, negotiated, and 
politically productive and legitimate.
II. Nollan and Dolan and The Federal Constitutionalization of Land Use Bargaining.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s entrance into the field in Nollan and Dolan,50 state 
courts had applied various state statutory and constitutional doctrines to develop differing 
standards of review for land use exactions.51  These standards varied considerably.52  When it 
articulated its pair of federal constitutional standards to evaluate the permissibility of exactions 
48 See Vicki Been, Smart Growth Requires Efficient Growth, 34 CONN. L. REV. 611, 613 (2002) (decrying the 
tendency of local governments that enable sprawl development to require insufficient exactions).
49
 The list of theoretically better regulatory practices includes local property taxation, aid passed to local 
governments from federal and state government tax revenues, and user charges for services.  See ALTSHULER & 
GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 2-3, 132-38.  Although more progressive and/ or more efficient, these alternatives 
are less popular politically than exactions and require statutory authority or beneficence from rival levels of 
government.  See id.
50
 Before Nollan, the Court had avoided property owners’ challenges to exactions under the federal Constitution on a 
number of occasions.  See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633 (1971), appeal 
dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So.2d 140 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 
442 (Wis. 1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (dismissed due to lack of substantial federal question).
51 See generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision 
Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146-56 (Winter 1987) (summarizing 
differing state approaches pre-Nollan); see, e.g., Joseph D. Lee, Note, Sudden Impact: The Effect of Dolan v. City of 
Tigard on Impact Fees in Washington, 71 WASH. L. REV. 205, 212-13 (1996) (summarizing judicial review of 
impact fees in Washington in which courts used statutory, takings, and substantive due process approaches).
52 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91.
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under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court established a uniform floor of property rights on 
what had previously been a diverse, experimental patchwork of state law.53  Before discussing 
the Nollan and Dolan decisions and their applicability to different types of exactions (the 
subjects of the second and third sections of this Part), the next section briefly describes the 
earlier state approaches.
A. Judicial Review and Statutory Limits to Exactions Prior to Nollan and 
Dolan.
State courts considering exactions before Nollan generally took one of three 
approaches.54  Some states, including Illinois and New Hampshire, adopted a strict “specific and 
uniquely attributable” test, which required an exaction to connect directly and be precisely 
proportional to the harm created by the new land use.55  In the Illinois case establishing the test, 
for example, the state supreme court struck down an exaction requiring plaintiffs to provide 
recreational and educational facilities because the municipality’s need for such facilities arose 
from the “total development of the community” rather than directly from the marginal increase in 
infrastructure costs that the plaintiff’s proposal would cause.56  Without an extremely close 
relationship to the harms generated, the court reasoned, an exaction would be confiscatory rather 
than a “reasonable regulation under the police power.”57
53 See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Impact of a Federal Takings Norm on Fashioning a Means-End 
Fit Under Takings Provisions of State Constitutions, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143 (1999).
54 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91; Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 22 URB. LAW. 23, 26-27 (1990); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court 
Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 750 & nn.80-82 (1988).
55 See Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (specific and 
uniquely attributable test); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (same); see 
also Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (Or. 1961) (holding that a fee imposed in lieu of land dedication
would be unconstitutional unless the money collected was earmarked to benefit the proposed subdivision); Frank 
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913-14 (R.I. 1970) (adopting Pioneer Trust to review park and land 
dedications).  The states that have adopted the specific and uniquely attributable test tend to be those with relatively 
slow patterns of growth in the midwest and northeast.  See Nicholas, supra note 36, at 95.
56
 Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
57 Id.
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Other states, most notably California, explicitly rejected the “specific and uniquely 
attributable” test in favor of a more deferential test requiring only that the municipality produce 
general proof and conclusions as to the connection between the exaction and proposed 
development.58  The more deferential approaches generally appeared in two forms:  in reasonable 
relationship tests, courts upheld exactions that had some reasonable degree of connection to the 
proposed development,59 or, most commonly,60 in somewhat more rigorous dual rational nexus 
tests. 61  These dual nexus tests considered the relationships between the exaction and the needs 
the proposed development would create, as well as that between the exaction and the benefits the 
development would enjoy.62  Despite the relative deference of these approaches, neither assured 
municipalities victory.63
58 See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d at 638, 640-41 & n.7 (adopting reasonable 
relationship test and rejecting Pioneer Trust); Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447 (same).
59 See, e.g., Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188-89 (Mont. 1964) (adopting reasonable 
relationship test and declaring that a legislatively determined exaction should be upheld unless the property owner 
demonstrates that the exaction is unreasonable); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966) (adopting 
reasonable relationship test); see generally William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko, The “Takings” Nexus—The 
Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 
381-88 (1988) (recounting California’s pre-Nollan exactions cases).  
60 See Thomas M. Pavelko, Note, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 269, 287 (1983).
61 See generally Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 993-96 (1989) (describing the rational nexus test developed in state courts before Nollan).  
These two relatively deferential approaches are difficult to distinguish in practice.  The Utah Supreme Court, for 
example, has declared its approach to be based on a “reasonableness” test, but has in practice considered both the 
extent to which the need for an exaction is reasonably attributable to the proposed development and the extent to 
which the benefits are demonstrable, if not solely directed to, the development’s future residents.  See Banberry Dev. 
Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981).
62 See Pavelko, supra note 60, at 993-96.
63 See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Town of Danbury, 230 A.2d 45, 46-47 (Conn. 
Super. 1967) (after upholding ordinance requiring dedication of park land based on maximum and minimum that did 
not impose “specifically and uniquely attributable” test, court invalidated as unconstitutional a fee imposed in lieu of 
dedication because the local ordinance did not require that the fee benefit the proposed subdivision); Howard 
County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908 (Md. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional an exaction imposed under county 
ordinance requiring a developer to indefinitely reserve land for a state road because exaction bore no reasonable 
nexus to the proposed development and deprived the developer of any use of his land).
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State legislatures played an important role in limiting exactions before Nollan and 
Dolan,64 and continue to do so today.65  By providing municipalities explicit authority to impose 
exactions, state statutes have limited exactions that require the dedication of land66 and impose 
impact fees.67  Prior to Nollan, state courts often invalidated exactions that lacked or exceeded 
statutory authority.68
B.     Nollan and Dolan.
Nollan and Dolan established two tests that the Supreme Court described as reflecting the 
mainstream of state court precedent for the relationship between a development proposal’s harms 
and an exaction’s conditions.69  These tests evaluate the degree of relationship between the 
exaction to the proposed development’s anticipated harms by imposing a heightened judicial 
scrutiny on exactions, one based on a rule-like command lower courts must apply.  In Nollan, the 
plaintiffs sought to demolish and replace a small, worn-down bungalow on their beachfront 
property and replace it with a three-bedroom house similar to those of their neighbors.70  The 
California Coastal Commission, from whom the Nollans needed a discretionary permit to build 
their new beach house,71 made issuance of the permit conditional on the Nollans' dedication of a 
public easement across the portion of their beachfront property that lay between the high tide line 
64 See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 35, at 76.
65 See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at §§ 9.11, 9.18, 9.21.
66 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65909(a) (West 2003) (prohibiting permit approval and zoning variance conditions 
requiring land dedications that are not “reasonably related” to the proposed use of the property).
67 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-801 et seq. (2003); (authorizing imposition of “land development charges”) 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-142 (2002) (authorizing counties to collect impact fees); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. Title 
12, § 395.001 et seq. (2003) (authorizing collection of impact fees).
68 See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (invalidating as beyond 
statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land dedication); Haugen, 359 P.2d at 111 (invalidating fee imposed 
on residential developers in lieu of park land dedication because failure of ordinance to limit use of funds to benefit 
made the fee a tax, which the county had no statutory authority to impose); see generally Delaney et al., supra note 
51, at 146 & n.49 (citing cases in which courts invalidated exactions for lack of statutory authority).
69 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
70 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
71 See id. (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106, 30212, 30600 (West 1986)).
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and the seawall that separated the beachfront from the rest of their property.72  The Commission 
justified this condition on the grounds that the Nollans’ larger house would obstruct the public’s 
visual access to the beach, increase private use of the shorefront, and burden the public's ability 
to traverse to and along the shorefront.  In all, the Commission concluded, these impacts would 
have adverse psychological effects on the public.73
The Supreme Court held that the Commission’s imposition of this condition violated the 
Takings Clause on the grounds that the easement—which if required outside the context of a 
permit application would have effected a taking for which compensation would unquestionably 
have been due74—lacked an “essential nexus” to the harm created by the proposed building.75
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia suggested that the Commission could have met the test 
for an essential nexus by requiring a more closely linked exaction—such as a “viewing spot,” a 
public viewing platform that would allow visual access to the beach over the top of the 
development—but that a lateral beach easement lacked such a nexus because it had little relation 
to the harm the Commission sought to address.76  Under its own regulations and without liability 
for a taking, the Commission could have denied the Nollans’ permit application; nevertheless, 
conditioning the permit’s approval on the Nollans’ granting of an unrelated easement to the 
public constituted, in Justice Scalia’s words, “an out-and-out plan of extortion” which as such 
required compensation.77
Nollan thus settled two issues:  whether exactions as a general matter are constitutionally 
permissible (they are) and what a specific exaction could require (a concession bearing an 
72 Id. at 828-29.
73 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
74 Id. at 831.
75 Id. at 837.
76 Id. at 836.
77 Id. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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essential nexus, or substantive relationship, to the proposed land use’s harms).  It left open, 
however, the issue of how much of a concession a government entity could permissibly require.  
That is, Nollan had settled the qualitative limits of exactions; seven years later, Dolan settled the 
quantitative issue.  In Dolan, the Court considered a property owner’s challenge to two 
conditions the city of Tigard, Oregon, placed on its approval of the property owner’s application 
to expand her hardware store.  The city required that she dedicate a portion of her land as a 
public greenway in order to mitigate flooding from a nearby creek, and that she dedicate a strip 
of land adjacent to the floodplain for a segment of a continuous bike path throughout the city in 
order to mitigate the increased traffic congestion that would result from the increased size of the 
hardware store.78  These conditions, unlike the beach easement in Nollan, bore an "essential 
nexus" to the harms expanding store would create, namely increases in impervious surfaces and 
in traffic created by shoppers driving to the store’s downtown location.79  Establishing a test it 
claimed to divine from the variety of prior state supreme court exactions cases,80 the Court held 
that the city had failed to show that the required concessions were in “‘rough proportionality’ . . . 
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”81  The Court placed the 
burden of proof on the government entity to establish, with some rough degree of precision and 
with more than simply “conclusory statement[s],” that its proposed exactions on land 
development would remediate the effects of the proposed development.82
78 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80 & n.2.
79 Id. at 386-88.
80 Id. at 390-91; but see Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and the Supreme Court: Throwing 
the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 231-32 & n.86 (1995) (arguing that the “rough 
proportionality” test had no support in state court precedent, and was in fact newly minted by the Court in Dolan).
81 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
82 Id. at 395-96.  Whether the burden is on the government to prove an essential nexus is unclear, however, because 
Nollan did not directly address the issue.  See Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land-Use Planning and 
Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 415, 445 (1995).
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In the final paragraph of his majority decision, Justice Rehnquist praised the city of 
Tigard for having undertaken the “commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by 
increasing urbanization,” as well as for seeking to further the “laudable” goals of “reducing 
flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways.”83  But, the Court 
cautioned, there are “outer limits” to the methods of achieving worthy land use planning goals.84
Those goals could not be reached “‘by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.’”85  Implicit in these remarks, and in the Court’s conclusion that in undertaking this task 
and furthering these goals the city had exceeded its constitutional authority, is the Court’s 
approval of the constitutionally permissible ends of land use exactions, and its articulation of 
exactions’ constitutional limits as quantitative and qualitative.  
To summarize the Court’s particularized approach to exactions:  Nollan established the 
constitutionally required logic of exactions, a logic that limits concessions to those that address 
and seek to internalize the harms and costs of the proposed project.  That logic’s constitutional 
minimum is an “essential nexus.”  Dolan established the constitutionally required metric of 
exactions, extending Nollan’s logic to a quantitative measure—rough proportionality—of the 
extent of the project’s expected harms.  
C. The Confused Scope of Nollan and Dolan’s Heightened Scrutiny.
As the Court clarified unanimously in its 1999 decision in Del Monte Dunes, Nollan and 
Dolan’s heightened scrutiny applies only in the “special context of exactions”; it cannot be 
applied to decisions to deny applications for discretionary approvals.86  As such, exactions are a 
83 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
86
 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1635 (1999) (declaring that Dolan was 
“not designed to address, and . . . not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the 
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category of land use regulations excepted from the default Penn Central approach to takings 
claims.  Notwithstanding the relative precision of the tests Nollan and Dolan declare, the 
applicability of this heightened scrutiny within the wide variety of exactions is not entirely 
certain.87 Nollan and Dolan’s reach is significant for the various entities interested in exactions, 
because when the federal constitution’s heightened scrutiny does not apply, courts review 
challenged exactions under their own, often more deferential, tests in which property owners 
may be less likely to win.88 I consider below the two central issues that remain unclear regarding 
the reach of Nollan and Dolan.89
1. The Possessory/ Non-Possessory Exaction Distinction. 
Neither Nollan nor Dolan resolved whether the essential nexus and rough proportionality 
tests apply only to exactions that require the dedication of land for public use (as in the facts of 
landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development”); id. at 1650 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the use of the Dolan standard "for reviewing land-use regulations generally”).  Although not a 
clear distinction—as Richard Epstein has argued, any land use regulation can be described as an exaction to the 
extent that it forbids or limits a particular land use while enabling other uses—the Court in Del Monte Dunes
explicitly declared the difference between stated and implied conditions to be constitutionally significant.  See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 20 (1993).
87 See generally Edward H. Ziegler, Development Exactions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme Court’s Nollan, 
Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAW. 155, 161-64 (2002) (describing issues resolved and left open 
by Del Monte Dunes); David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property 
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 523, 567-74 (1999) (describing open issues prior to Del Monte Dunes).
88 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (where Nollan and 
Dolan do not apply, reviewing exaction for its “reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the 
deleterious public impact of the development”).
89
 I do not consider below an additional issue whose complexity renders it beyond the scope of this Article.  It is 
unclear whether the mere offer of an unconstitutional exaction made during the application review process may be 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the federal Takings Clause, even if the property owner rejects or the 
government withdraws the offered exaction.  See generally Andrew W. Schwartz, The Application of Nollan/Dolan 
Heightened Scrutiny to Legislative Regulations and “Unsuccessful Exactions,” presented to October 1999 Litigating 
Regulatory Takings Claims Conference, Georgetown University Law Center, available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/conference/schwartz.htm (discussing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 
306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1996); Lambert, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d at 568-69).  In Goss, the Eighth Circuit held that Dolan could 
apply to the city’s denial of an application to rezone property after its owner refused the city’s condition that he deed 
a portion of his land to the city to widen an adjacent road  In Lambert, by contrast, an intermediate appellate court in 
California held that a city’s denial of a conditional permit should not be reviewed under the heightened scrutiny of 
Nollan and Dolan despite evidence in the record showing the city would have issued the permit if owners had agreed 
to pay an impact fee.
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Nollan and Dolan themselves), or whether they extend to exactions such as impact fees or other 
concessions that do not require the dedication of land.90 The Court in Del Monte Dunes noted 
that none of its decisions had extended Dolan beyond exactions requiring dedication of 
property91 and some state and lower federal courts have relied on that distinction when they have 
refused to extend heightened scrutiny to non-possessory exactions.92  At the same time, a 
significant number of courts have applied heightened scrutiny to non-dedicatory exactions 
applied in individualized proceedings.93
90 See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing Dolan, in which the challenged exaction required the 
property owner to dedicate part of her land to the city, from other regulatory takings cases applying different 
standards of review, in which the challenged regulations imposed conditions that were “simply a limitation on the 
use” the property owners made of their land).  This distinction between dedicatory and non-dedicatory exactions is 
consistent with the Court’s repeated statements, both in Nollan and in other takings cases, that required dedications 
demand more careful judicial review because of the “heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the 
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.”  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841; see also Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1015 (distinguishing permanent physical invasions, “no matter how minute the intrusion,” from other 
land use regulations, unless the latter deny “all economically beneficial or productive use of land”). On the 
confusion in state and lower federal courts prior to Del Monte Dunes over whether Nollan and Dolan apply to 
exactions requiring other than the dedication of land, see Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of 
Monterey and Its Implications for Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195, 203-05 (1999).
91 Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. at 1635 (limiting application of heightened scrutiny to those conditions for approval 
that require “the dedication of property to public use”); but see Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 
P.2d 429, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d on different grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002) (concluding that 
statements in Del Monte Dunes limiting Dolan to exactions requiring dedications of land were dicta); Bruce W. 
Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications: National and Texas Law After Dolan and Del Monte Dunes, 
32 URB. LAW. 561, 582 (2000) (asserting that Del Monte Dunes statement was dicta, and further arguing that 
distinction between dedicatory and non-dedicatory exactions is meaningless).    
92 See, e.g., Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998) (Nollan and Dolan  do not apply to ordinance 
requiring landlords to provide cash relocation assistance to tenants displaced as a result of redevelopment); Clajon 
Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Nollan and Dolan are best understood as extending the 
analysis of complete physical occupation cases to those situations in which the government achieves the same end 
(i.e., the possession of one's physical property) through a conditional permitting procedure."); McCarthy v. City of 
Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (Nollan and Dolan do not apply to traffic impact fee ordinance); Henry v. 
Jefferson County Planning Comm'n, 148 F.Supp.2d 698, 709 n. 142 (N.D.W.Va. 2001) (refusing to apply Dolan to 
use permit conditions that required public improvements to property, in part because conditions did not involve 
dedication of land for public use).  One recent state supreme court case made an even finer distinction: Dolan
applies to required dedications of land in which the land is made open to the public generally, but not to required 
dedications that would be open only to the future residents of the subdivision for which the exaction was to be 
required.  See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000).
93 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Nollan 
and Dolan "apply, under the circumstances of this case, to the monetary exaction imposed by Culver City as a 
condition of approving plaintiff's [rezoning] request"); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 71 
S.W.3d 18, 34 (2002), rehearing overruled (applying Nollan and Dolan to exaction requiring improvements to 
public street); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 
that Nollan and Dolan apply "where the City requires the developer as a condition of approval to incur substantial 
22
Courts have reason to assume the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to impact fees.  Prior 
to its decision in Del Monte Dunes, the Court had remanded to the California Supreme Court the 
California Court of Appeal decision in Ehrlich v. Culver City, which applied a relatively low 
standard of review to impact fee exactions.  The Court directed the California court to review the 
decision in light of the recently issued decision in Dolan.94   Although it has yet to face the issue 
directly, the Court’s remand of Ehrlich and lower federal and state court decisions (including the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Ehrlich) may have settled the issue in favor of extending 
Nollan and Dolan to non-possessory exactions like impact fees.95
2. The Adjudicative/ Legislative Distinction.
Also unresolved is whether the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests apply only 
to exactions imposed by adjudicative decisions regulating individual piece of land, or if they 
extend also to legislative decisions regulating an entire jurisdiction or larger units thereof.96  This 
costs improving an adjoining street”), aff’d on different grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002).  
94
 512 U.S. 1231, 1145 S.Ct. 2731 (1994).
95 See generally Stroud, supra note 90, at 202-06 (discussing the split among courts on this point and possible 
implications of Del Monte Dunes).  Commentators arguing against the possessory/ non-possessory distinction 
include J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied 
Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go From Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 397-401 (2002); Callies, 
supra note 87, at 568-72; Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces Into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 995, 1036-37 (1997); Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to 
Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 513, 540-43 (1995).  Some commentators propose a test for challenges to 
impact fees based on substantive due process rather than the Takings Clause.  See Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James 
C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: THE 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 357, 359-63 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (citing Hollywood Inc. v. Broward 
County, 431 S. 2d 606, 609-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) (arguing for due process-based dual rational nexus test 
that would consider whether there was a reasonable connection between, first, locality’s need for additional capital 
facilities and the new development, and second, the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new 
development). 
96 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing between challenges to "essentially legislative determinations 
classifying entire areas of the city,” and the challenges reviewed in Dolan (and, by implication, Nollan), which were 
to “adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel”); see 
also id. at 391 n.8 (noting that judicial review of “an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a 
building permit on an individual parcel” applies heightened scrutiny and places the burden rests on the government 
entity to prove that an exaction did not effect a taking, as opposed to judicial review of “generally applicable zoning 
regulations,” which proceeds under a more relaxed scrutiny with the burden on the property owner to demonstrate 
that the exaction constitutes a taking).  More recently, the Court denied certiorari in a case in which the Georgia 
Supreme Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny to its review of land use regulations imposed by a zoning 
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distinction, which is harder to discern in the smaller, less formal governmental structures of 
municipalities than in federal and state governments,97 assumes that the Takings Clause is most 
likely to be implicated when an individual is singled out through an adjudicative-type act by a 
government agency.  When the regulation affects large segments of the public, the Takings 
Clause is less commonly implicated.98  In addition, because a legislatively enacted exaction 
provides regulatory certainty to property owners, it is less likely to be an unanticipated 
frustration of property owners’ investment-backed expectations.99  Lower federal and state courts 
ordinance.  A dissent written by Justice Thomas, and joined only by Justice O’Connor, attacked the legislative/ 
adjudicative distinction as unclear, illogical, and essentially meaningless.  See Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of 
Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
97 See Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 260-61 (2000); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic 
Constraints in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REV. 525, 544-49 (1990).  In the smaller setting of local government, 
where political minorities or individuals can sometimes more easily overcome political majorities through greater 
access to representatives and where effected parties may have more constitutional protections of due process rights, 
adjudicative processes can often be more protective of individuals’ property rights than legislative ones.  See
Reznik, supra, at 272-73.  Indeed, the exactions reviewed in both Nollan and Dolan could be understood as broadly 
applicable rather than as individualized adjudications, as the majorities in both cases seem to treat them.  See Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 414 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“The majority characterizes this case as involving an 
‘adjudicative decision’ to impose permit conditions, but the permit conditions were imposed pursuant to Tigard's 
Community Development Code.  The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested variance from the permit 
conditions otherwise required to be imposed by the Code."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829 (noting that the Coastal 
Commission had placed similar conditions on "43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of 
land. . . . [O]f the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative 
regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront 
property.").  State courts seem quite capable of making fine distinctions, however.  Compare Dudek v. Umatilla 
County, 69 P.3d 751 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Dolan to legislatively adopted exaction scheme where ordinance 
grants discretion to county to determine extent of exaction); with Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington County, 45 
P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1482 (2003) (refusing to 
apply heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively determined “system development charge” of traffic 
impact fees levied by local government under authority of state statute).
98 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1348 (1991).  Accordingly, as Lee 
Ann Fennell has noted, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative decisions continues to retain both logical 
coherence and conceptual importance given the distinction the Court stressed in Del Monte Dunes between 
exactions and development denial.  See Fennell, supra note 13, at 10-11.  
99 See Dana, supra  note 13, at 1261 n.92; Douglas R. Porter, Will Developers Pay to Play, in DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT FEES: POLICY RATIONALE, PRACTICE, THEORY, AND ISSUES 73, 76 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988); see also
George Wyeth, Regulatory Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 131 n.136 (1996) (arguing 
that competitive pressures among jurisdiction will also make it less likely that municipalities will effect takings 
through legislative acts than through individualized, site-specific regulation).
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tend to respect this distinction and extend Nollan and Dolan only to individualized exactions,100
although some courts,101 with the approval of some commentators,102 have nevertheless applied 
heightened scrutiny to legislatively enacted exactions. 
III. Takings Formalism, Regulatory Formulas.
In their logic and metrics, Nollan and Dolan are instances of the Supreme Court’s 
uneven, gradual imposition of a more robust Takings jurisprudence that provides stronger 
protection for property owners against land use regulations.  Like other categorical exceptions to 
the multi-factor, ad hoc balancing test that generally applies to Takings claims, Nollan and 
Dolan’s “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests require courts to apply heightened 
scrutiny to challenged land use regulations.  Below I assert that the Court’s explicit purpose in 
formulating these tests was to protect property owners and the classical liberal conception of 
property from the incursion of powerful, overreaching government agencies.  I associate this 
move with the Court’s similar desire to protect property owners from state and lower federal 
courts that might, despite the Court’s tests, still issue decisions that uphold local governments’ 
“extortion” through exactions.  To create a doctrinal shield that would sufficiently protect 
property rights, the Court has attempted to articulate a fairly tight, rule-based command to lower
100 See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (refusing 
to extend Dolan to legislative water resources development fee); San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 103 (refusing to extend 
Nollan and Dolan to generally applicable fee for converting residential hotel room); Krupp v. Breckenridge 
Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (refusing to apply Dolan to, and subsequently upholding, generally 
applicable sewer fees);  Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); 
Rogers Machinery, 45 P.3d at 966 (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively 
determined “system development charge” of traffic impact fees levied by local government under authority of state 
statute).
101 See Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. South Dakota, 236 F.Supp.2d 989, 1026-29 (D.S.D. 2002) (applying Nollan and 
Dolan to state eminent domain statute requiring private railroads that use statute to acquire land to grant easement to 
other public entities and groups) (D. S.D. filed Dec. 6, 2002); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton and Miami Valley v. 
Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000); Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce v. Lincoln City, 991 P.2d 1080, 
1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 6 P.3d 1101 (Or. 2000); Isla Verde, 990 P.2d at 429.
102 See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 95, at 401-07 (2002) (arguing that, whether understood as relying on the Takings 
Clause or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Nollan and Dolan should apply to legislative as well as 
adjudicative exactions).
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courts and government agencies, one that limits exactions to the abatement of nuisance-like 
impacts caused by the proposed land use.  At once clear—exactions must pass tests of nexus and 
proportionality—and indeterminate—the reach of these tests is expansive and indeterminate—
the Court’s commands have affected land use regulation in important ways.  Specifically, they 
have helped lead to the increased use of regulatory formulas rather than individualized, 
negotiated exactions.
This Part establishes the linkage between doctrine and regulatory practice through a 
series of related claims.  It begins by placing Nollan and Dolan’s formalist desire—composed of 
a particular jurisprudential vision of rule-like commands and a normative vision of robust 
property rights—within the Court’s general trend towards excepting certain types of regulatory 
acts or effects from the generally applicable deferential standard for takings claims.  The first 
three sections thereby establish what the Article means by “takings formalism.”  The final 
section describes the result of this vision of takings in the context of exactions: a trend among 
state and local governments of movement away from negotiated, ad hoc exactions and towards 
legislated, fee-based formulas as a preconstituted remedy for the harms and costs of all relevant 
development proposals.  Although it cannot be proved that Nollan and Dolan caused this trend, I 
note that their combined clarity and indeterminacy give local governments strong incentives to 
adopt such exaction formulas in order to avoid or successfully defend against constitutional 
challenges to the resulting exactions, and that the limited empirical evidence to date on the cases’ 
impact shows some significant effect.
A. Takings Rules and the Desire for Doctrinal Clarity.
In establishing separate, heightened scrutiny of certain categories of alleged takings, the 
Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the ad hoc, fact-intensive balancing approach it has 
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established as the dominant test for regulatory acts that require compensation.103 Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City established the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” of 
alleged regulatory takings,104 which require courts to balance, among other things, “[t]he 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”105 and “the character of the governmental 
action.”106  The two most widely recognized categorical exceptions to the Penn Central test 
concern government acts that effect a permanent physical occupation of land, typically 
associated with the Court’s decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,107 and 
those that deny an owner “all economically beneficial uses” of her land, as established in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.108   The “permanent physical occupation” category 
constitutes a conceptually narrow and rare outer boundary of land use regulation that, in the 
opaque universe of takings law, is relatively easy to spot and administer.  The “denial of all 
economic use” rule is, at least in the abstract, also an easily identifiable outlier of land use 
regulation’s effects that requires application of a simple command:  If the regulation renders the 
property valueless, a court must apply a particularized type of heightened scrutiny to determine if 
103 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that in reviewing regulatory takings challenges, courts generally 
eschew set formulas and instead engage in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (reaffirming Penn Central approach as default for judicial review of regulatory 
takings claims); id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and 
Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U.COLO. L. REV. 599, 612 (1991); 
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1681-82 (1988).
104
 438 U.S. at 124.
105 Ibid.
106 Id. at 124.  The extent of the Court’s invitation to balance has reached absurd lengths in California, where the 
Supreme Court has articulated thirteen different, potentially relevant factors for consideration, and where courts 
occasionally weigh all thirteen in the balance.  See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860-
61 (1997) (listing and explaining factors); see, e.g., Massingill v. Dep’t of Food & Agriculture, 102 Cal.App.4th 
498, 507-08 (2002) (applying factors). 
107
 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).  The physical invasion test may not be as simple as it appears, however.  See Joseph 
William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 224-28 (1993); see 
also Poirier, supra note 14, at 108 n.56 (citing cases that complicate physical invasion rule).
108
 505 U.S. at 1019.
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the regulation does not in fact require compensation.109  With respect to takings claims that do 
not fall within the ambit of one of these categories, the Court “still resist[s] the temptation to 
adopt per se rules . . ., preferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple 
‘mathematically precise’ formula.”110
Proponents of takings rules claim there are a number of advantages to clear declarations 
of the extent of property owners’ constitutional rights and to simple tests for courts to ascertain 
whether a regulatory action violates those rights.  First and foremost, clear takings rules could 
enhance decisional and allocative efficiency.111  By limiting the discretion of judges and 
administrative decisionmakers in evaluating whether any regulation or its application would 
109
 Nevertheless, the latter category, typically referred to as the Lucas category in honor of the decision establishing 
it, is subject to numerous complications.  At least two additional major questions remain about Lucas, however.  
First, Lucas excepts from its compensation requirement for regulations that render land valueless those background 
principles of the common law of property and nuisance that limit the property owner’s antecedent rights to use and 
develop her property.  See id. 1027.  This simply begs the question of how courts administer the unknown and 
possibly indeterminate exceptions that Lucas establishes under which the government may nevertheless avoid 
paying compensation despite its regulation’s denial of all economic value.  Second, as the dissents and concurrence 
raise in Lucas itself, it is the rare regulation that reduces a parcel’s value to zero, and it may not have even been the 
case for the Lucas plaintiff’s land.  See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1065 
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting);  1076 (statement of Souter, J.); see also Wyer v. Board of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192 
(Me. 2000) (holding that where property retains value for “parking, picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses,” 
a law protecting dunes that prohibits construction on a building lot does not fall within Lucas category).  Given the 
benefit to plaintiffs of falling within the Lucas category, parties will likely expend significant effort in litigating the 
issue of economic value.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A third complication was resolved by the Court in its recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  There, the Court considered the issue of whether a 
moratorium rendering a property owner’s parcel temporarily valueless effects a categorical taking.  In doing so, the 
Court considered whether a parcel could be conceptually severed—in terms of time as well as space—for purposes 
of a takings analysis.  That is, if a regulation rendered part of a larger parcel valueless, or a parcel valueless for a 
period of an owner’s fee simple absolute, could the property owner utilize Lucas to seek compensation for that part 
or period?  The Court clearly rejected a temporal severance approach in Tahoe-Sierra, and seemed also to resolve 
the spatial severance issue similarly.  See id. at 331 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31) (declaring that the 
denominator, or the parcel under review in an alleged takings, is the “parcel as a whole” rather than the regulated 
portion, and upholding a series of development moratoria and in the process making it more difficult for property 
owners to be compensated for delays during which their property is denied economic value); see generally Poirier, 
supra note 14, at 109-11 (2002) (summarizing long-standing debates over denominator issue and Tahoe-Sierra’s 
possible role in settling them); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967) (initially establishing debate over 
denominator issue).
110 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633, 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
111 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1449 
(2000); Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372, 416-17 
(1986).
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effect a taking, clear constitutional commands promise a level of value-neutral doctrinal 
coherence, which ostensibly would enable the smooth deduction of regular results across 
disparate, individual cases.112  Such stability would force fairness and predictability across 
decisions, with the result that like cases would be treated equally by decision-makers who would 
waste few resources in applying a clear rule to resolve every dispute.113  Coherence, 
predictability, and fairness in turn would affect the behavior of property owners and investors, 
who typically view rule-bound certainty as better protecting their expectations than the ex post 
nature of the Court’s ad hoc balancing tests.  The stability promised by formalist takings rules 
thus would invite individuals to commit resources to capital projects, and therefore enables the 
highest and best use of property.114
A second advantage of takings rules, according to some advocates, is that they would 
establish and help enforce increased protection for property owners embattled by the regulatory 
overreach of local, state, and federal governmental entities.  Formal takings rules would thereby 
smooth the “frictions” caused by the struggles over regulatory indeterminacy and uncertainty, 
stabilizing and protecting property rights within the present distribution of property ownership 
and entitlements.115  Seen from this angle, categorical takings tests deploy formal rules in order 
to redistribute power from local government to property owners; thus, they further a normative 
112 See Ross, supra note 111, at 416-17.
113
 Scholars who advocate clear rules cite this as a general advantage of clear commands over ad hoc standards.  See
Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All ‘er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 532-36 
(1999); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-80 (1989).
114 See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1449.
115 See Epstein, supra note 1, at 490-91.  Theoretically, clear rules could be articulated and enforced in favor of 
government regulation and against property rights.  For example, instead of an ad hoc balancing test for partial 
takings, a constitutional takings rule could command that any regulation that leaves 90% or less of the value of the 
subject property does not require compensation.  This rule, too, would provide decisional efficiency, at least in the 
abstract—but as in Lucas, litigation would occur over the remaining value of the subject property. See supra note 
109.
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vision and narrative of judicial intervention against an expansionist regulatory state.116  Rule-
based formalism in the takings context, then, links a set of clear rules to a classical liberal 
conception of broad, static, and well-protected property rights.117
Underlying the utilitarian and normative claims about categorical regulatory takings is a 
jurisprudential desire for formal and doctrinal stability.118   In the areas in which they operate, 
categorical rules dictate to state courts and state and local legislatures “the jurisprudential spirit 
in which their general laws of property and nuisance are to be read and construed.” 119  This 
“spirit” in turn forces states to establish land use regulatory regimes that take the form of 
“monadic, specific rules [rather than] that of complexly interactive open principles.”120  The 
formalist desire of an occasional majority of the Supreme Court has been incompletely 
instantiated within the bifurcated structure of current takings law, leaving the majority of alleged 
takings untouched121 and specific issues within categories unresolved.122  Although their inroads 
116 See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753-54 (1988).
117 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, The Liberal Conception of Property: Crosscurrents in the Jurisprudence of 
Takings, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120, 133-35 (1993).
118 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE 
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 238-39 (1990); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1219-20 (1999).  To the extent that the Court’s rule-formalism is linked to its normative 
commitment to protect property rights, it clearly manifests a desire to limit the possibility for judicial discretion that 
would undercut property rights.  I use the term desire, whether for rules or for a whole and identifiable conception of 
property rights, in its intentionalist, psychological, and psychoanalytic implications.  See STANLEY FISH, THERE’S 
NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 143 (1994) (tying formalism’s popularity to the 
appeal of its purported ability to resolve problems and disputes); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The 
Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47 FLA. L. REV. 815, 832-33 (1995) (describing psychological attractions of 
formalism); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 239 314-19 (1994) (describing psychoanalytic desire for discernible conception of property).
119
 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993).
120 Id.
121 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322, 332 (distinguishing condemnations and physical takings from regulatory 
takings, and characterizing Lucas as representing a rare departure from the default fact specific inquiry for 
regulatory takings); Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1446; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of 
Takings, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 594 (1996) (describing Supreme Court’s formalist interventions as symbolic and 
of limited application).
122 See supra Part II.C.
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into the Takings “muddle”123 may be limited and their own stability may be vulnerable in 
practice and questionable in principle, formal, categorical takings rules at least bear “the feel of 
legality”124 and provide a “good dose of formalization” to the presumptively open ground of 
takings.125  Thus, the occasionally triumphant desire for clarity, precision, and protection has 
produced exceptional and categorical formal rules that depart from default, multi-factor 
balancing tests.  The two sections that follow explain how Nollan and Dolan fit within this 
general effort to stabilize and protect property rights under the Takings Clause.  
B. Nexus and Proportionality as Doctrinal Shields.
The Court intended Nollan’s nexus test and Dolan’s rough proportionality test to serve as 
doctrinal shields, protecting property owners and the integrity of private property rights against 
the effects of local governments’ unchecked monopoly over their police powers.  Concerned that 
local governments used their monopoly regulatory power to require vulnerable individuals to 
cede their constitutionally protected right to exclude others from their property, the Court in 
Nollan and Dolan assumed that property owners seeking issuance of a discretionary approval are 
powerless—they have no option but to agree to the conditions imposed by the local government, 
and they have no leverage that would enable them to bargain their way to a better deal.  The 
Court’s intent in Nollan and Dolan was to protect property owners from the forced, inequitable 
bargains that result from the presumptively inequitable distribution of power in the relationship 
between the land use regulatory body and the regulated individual property owner.126
123
 Carol Rose coined the term “muddle” for the complicated, often confusing appearance of modern takings law.  
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
124
 Michelman, supra note 12, at 1628.
125
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1988); 
see also Michelman, supra note 12, at 1622 (describing noticeable movement of Court “towards a reformalization of 
regulatory-takings doctrine”).
126 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86 (“Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between the 
building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the public easements.”); Nollan, 
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In Nollan, the Court made this suspicion explicit, characterizing the lateral beach 
easement required of the Nollans as “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”127  Finding no 
relationship between the California Coastal Commission’s stated justification and the means 
used to achieve those ends, the Court implied that the government had engaged in little more 
than a sleight of hand meant to disguise its strong-arm tactics as a logical and permissible 
regulatory act.  But the exaction’s demonstrable illogic, the Court held, made the extortion plan 
manifest, and the essential nexus test, by requiring application of a particular logic, can uncover 
such constitutionally impermissible efforts.128
The Court’s further uncovering of municipal extortion explicitly appeared in Dolan in its 
invocation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.129  As the Court described it, this doctrine 
prohibits the government from “requir[ing] a person to give up a constitutional right—here the 
right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a 
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no 
relationship to the property.”130  The rough proportionality test precludes a forced exchange in 
which the property owner is coerced by a deceitful and untrustworthy governmental entity to 
cede the full complement of rights in her land—a concession that would otherwise require 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment—as a condition for receiving the permit required to 
483 U.S. at 841-42 (characterizing Coastal Commission’s actions as compelling Nollans to contribute land to the 
public when it was required to utilize its eminent domain power to pay for the land); see generally Fennell, supra 
note 13, at 15 (describing Supreme Court’s implicit distrust of local governments in its exactions cases).
127 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (internal citation and quotation omitted).  
128 See id. (“[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts 
that purpose to something other than what it was.”).   
129 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; see also id. at 387 (quoting Nollan’s characterization of exactions that lack an essential 
nexus as “an out-and-out plan of extortion”).  
130
 Id. at 385.  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was also implicitly invoked in Nollan.  See Been, supra note 
13, at 474; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463 (1989).
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intensify the use of that land.131  By imposing a metric that identifies when a required concession 
has forced a property owner to bear unfairly the entirety of public burdens,132 the rough 
131
 I assume throughout this Article that Nollan and Dolan are better understood as takings cases analogous to 
unconstitutional conditions precedents, rather than as unconstitutional conditions cases with a takings overlay.  The 
Court’s reasoning and analysis in Nollan and Dolan clearly emphasized takings precedents over a thorough 
discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  As in other takings cases, the Nollan and Dolan decisions 
begin their analysis with the regulatory act’s effect on property rights, stressing in both cases that the dedication 
requirement constituted a “permanent physical occupation” that removed from the plaintiffs’ bundle of property
rights the essential stick of the right to exclude.  See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (characterizing required dedication 
of easement as akin to permanent physical occupation of land in its deprivation of right to exclude); id. at 393-94 
(emphasizing that loss of right to exclude denied the property owners a fundamental right of property owners); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (same).  The Court then applied the standard test for contemporary takings analysis, 
which asks whether the regulation “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.”  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 
(citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 (same).  Assuming (in Nollan) or 
conceding (in Dolan) that the state’s interests were legitimate (see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-
36), the Court devised the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests to evaluate whether the conditions that 
effected takings for which compensation was due substantially advanced those interests.  See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
837 (describing essential nexus standard as test to evaluate whether “the condition substituted for the prohibition . . . 
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition”); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 
(characterizing rough proportionality standard as logical second test for exactions that applies more precise standard 
to evaluate whether the state’s legitimate interest is substantially advanced).
Ultimately, the Court’s reliance on takings rather than unconstitutional conditions may be because, 
notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist’s strange claim in Dolan that the latter doctrine is “well-settled,” the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is perhaps even more indeterminate than the muddled Takings clause 
jurisprudence. Compare Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, with Sullivan, supra note 130, at 1416 (describing judicial 
application of doctrine as “riven with inconsistencies”); and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem 
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (complaining of inconsistent judicial 
application of the doctrine so marked “as to make a legal realist of almost any reader”).  Attempts to impose 
theoretical coherence to the doctrine have failed to settle the field in the least.  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, 
Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-6 (2001) 
(summarizing earlier attempts, noting their failures, and offering still another such attempt).  Nollan only implicitly 
invokes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, makes no mention of either the doctrine or any cases (including 
Dole v. South Dakota, a decision explicitly relying upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that had been 
decided earlier in the same term) that apply the doctrine, and includes little more than unspecific citations to two 
free speech cases decided within the unconstitutional conditions rubric.  Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203 (1987) (upholding, after thorough discussion and application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, federal 
program conditioning highway funding on states’ imposition of a minimum drinking age) with Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
385 (citing only Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); and Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School 
Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).  
At minimum, the Court’s willful lack of interest in working through the difficult uncertainties of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its comparatively fulsome efforts in sorting precedent and doctrine in the 
takings field demonstrate the Court’s recognition that Dolan is best understood as a Fifth Amendment case with 
some coloring from unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  See generally Fennell, supra note 13, at 45 (asserting that 
in exactions context the unconstitutional conditions doctrine plays a secondary role to the substantive Takings 
doctrine by serving as a “lens for monitoring the things that the government is attempting to receive and give”); but 
see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 976 n.331 (2000) (arguing 
that Dolan is an unconstitutional conditions, rather than regulatory takings, case); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City 
of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (1995) (reading Nollan as an 
unconstitutional conditions case that protects the society-wide benefits of the Takings Clause against expansive 
regulations that inefficiently allocate real property resources); EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 180-83 (reading Nollan as 
an unconstitutional conditions case providing necessary, but second-best, protection for property owners under siege 
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proportionality test extended Nollan’s effort to uncover constitutionally impermissible exactions.  
Nollan and Dolan thereby provide doctrinal shields that protect property owners who are most 
vulnerable to the police powers’ exercise when local governments, susceptible to majoritarian 
influence,133 overregulate undeveloped land and exploit individuals and newcomers.134
In addition to its concern with the government’s unfair use of its bargaining power, the 
Court in Nollan and Dolan also noted the inefficiencies that it predicted would follow if the 
judiciary failed to intervene in the exaction bargaining process.  This is consistent with what 
commentators have noted are the dual concerns of Takings Clause jurisprudence with fairness 
and efficiency.135  The dual concern is clearest in Dolan, which specifically requires careful, 
individualized determinations to ensure that exactions “relate[] both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development” in order to limit them to no more than the internalization 
from expansive land use regulations that should be, but are not, declared unconstitutional).  When it explicitly 
invoked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, then, the Court in Dolan implicitly adopted Cass Sunstein’s 
suggestion that it substitute the set of specific questions it has developed and applied inconsistently in the 
unconstitutional conditions context with a more specific inquiry into “first, the nature of the incursion on the 
relevant [constitutional] right [made vulnerable by an extortionate condition by the state], and second, the legitimacy 
and strength of the government's justifications for any such incursion.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. 
REV. 593, 620-21 (1990).
132 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).   
133 See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1581, 1582 (1988) (“Local governments are more prone to majoritarianism than other levels of government because 
they usually lack the electoral diversity that comes with large land area and large population and because, as 
derivative governments, they also lack the other constitutional checks on the will of the majority, such as bicameral 
legislatures and separation of powers.”); see also FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 137 (observing that legislation by the 
national legislature should be given higher judicial deference than local legislative acts because it is less susceptible 
to majoritarian capture).
134
 Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 195 
(1989) (arguing that the land use regulatory process is especially susceptible to bias among large, homogenous 
factions).
135 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
997, 998-99 (1999); see also Michelman, supra note 109, at 1181-82 (relying on normative criteria of allocative 
efficiency and distributive justice to judge collective action).  Courts more typically emphasize the fairness rationale, 
however.  See Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. at 1635 (“[C]oncerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause.”); 
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998) (plurality opinion) (finding a regulatory taking where the 
retroactive burden was “substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience”); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 
(stating that Takings Clause is intended to prevent government from “forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. 
at 49).
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by the property owner of the external costs of development.136  According to the Court, this test 
curbs the government’s authority to force upon property owners a trade whose costs to them are 
greater than the benefits it provides to the public.137 Nollan relied on the same claim.  In the 
absence of judicial intervention, the Court assumed, municipalities would increase their 
bargaining leverage by producing more stringent land-use regulations, only to waive them in 
exchange for even more beneficial, unrelated amenities.138  This would lead local governments to 
realize fewer of the land-use goals they purportedly sought to meet than if they imposed more 
lenient but nontradeable development restrictions.139
In Nollan and Dolan, then, the Court posited that municipalities have the incentives and 
authority both to overregulate, by establishing stricter controls than they otherwise would 
promulgate, and to underregulate (at least in contrast to their stated aim in establishing land use 
ordinances and regulation), by using their enhanced bargaining leverage to bargain for even 
greater, unrelated amenities.140  The Court assumed that local governments would, in the absence 
of judicial intervention, extort property from their citizens and regularly shift between strategic 
over- and underregulation, thereby harming all of the jurisdiction’s property owners and 
residents.  Nollan and Dolan accordingly sought to protect the regulators, the regulated, and 
affected third parties alike from local governments’ overreaching, rent-seeking tendencies.  
136 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
137 See id. at 393-95 (evaluating conditions required of the Dolans, and concluding that each requires too much in 
light of the impacts of the proposed development). 
138 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5.
139
 Id.  
140 See Been, supra note 13, at 491 (“Requiring a local government to spend exactions on projects that are germane 
to the harm the development causes limits the potential profit from overregulation and thereby helps to ensure the 
efficient level of regulation.”).  One of the strongest and most influential arguments doubting the ability and 
willingness of local governments to regulate fairly and efficiently is Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
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As a broad assertion, the Court’s narrative of the good guys and bad guys of local land 
use regulation is unpersuasive on a number of grounds.  First, the Court ignored the extent to 
which parties adversely affected by local government decisions and deferential state courts have 
recourse to higher and competing legislative bodies.  Affected property owners and developers 
may, and often do, seek assistance from state governments to provide statutory protections 
against rent-seeking, exploitative behavior by local governments.141  Such assistance may come 
in the general forms of state takings statutes that provide more protection than federal 
constitutional guarantees142 and of more specifically targeted legislation that limits the authority, 
scope, and extent of the exactions municipalities may impose.143
Second, the Court failed to recognize that property owners may seek friendlier land use 
regulatory regimes in other jurisdictions.144  Indeed, jurisdictions may actively compete for 
particular development projects, offering not merely to waive exactions and cede other 
regulatory authority but to provide incentives to attract certain types of development.145
Utilizing an opportunity to exit is an individual’s response to her frustrated financial, social, and 
141 See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1037-39 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
142 See Carl P. Marcellino, The Evolution of State Takings Legislation and the Proposals Considered During the 
1997-98 Session, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB POL’Y 143 (1998-99); Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: 
The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187 (1997).
143 See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 9.21.
144 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (developing 
hypothesis of consumer-voters sorting themselves based on preferences for package of taxes, services, and 
amenities).  Of course, local governments can only offer distinct public goods to the extent that they have the legal 
authority (to tax, spend, and regulate) and fiscal ability to do so.  See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES (2001).  Moreover, the Tiebout hypothesis can only explain the exit and entrance of those individuals with 
the capacity and wealth to opt out and in to communities; obviously, no one would “choose” to opt in to poor local 
services.  See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28-34 (1998).  As noted below, some property 
owners or developers may be better able to exit than others—an argument that leads inexorably to a contextualist, 
balancing approach to takings claims, rather than to a formulaic, rule-like command for judicial review.
145 See Fred P. Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra note 95, at 350; Been, supra
note 13, at 511-28.
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political expectations.146 But the Court ignores the exit option available to property owners who, 
faced with an unfriendly, overregulating jurisdiction, may simply move to a friendlier one and, 
as a result, damage the first jurisdiction’s property values and tax base.147  Assuming that local 
governments are more susceptible to corruption or more likely to extort not only undervalues the 
role of exit, but it also overvalues the roles of coalition politics and interest group pluralism that 
would lead majoritarian local governments to exploit vulnerable property owners.148
Third, the Court assumed the political victimhood of a broad class of potential takings 
plaintiffs despite differences in their intentions, political leverage, wealth, and property.  The 
developers that slow growth jurisdictions most tend to fight (either with denials or stringent 
exaction requirements) may be “high-stakes players,” capable of seeking their own financial or 
political solutions to instances of attempted coercion through their own political voice,149 or of 
simply abandoning the jurisdiction.  Large developers are not the only potential takings plaintiffs 
who can fend for themselves.  Owners of undeveloped property that developers might buy can, 
in many instances, both constitute an interest group themselves and form political alliances with
developers.
146 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES 15-17 (1970).
147
 Rose, supra note 24, at 882-87.
148 See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on 
“Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 89-93 (1989).  The Court also undervalues the 
importance of political voice, both as a bulwark against exploitation and, ultimately, as a crucial value in local 
politics.  See Part V-B, infra.
149 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 120 (2001); 
see also Deakin, supra note 40, at 106 (noting close ties between real estate development industry and elected 
officials in local communities).  For example, one or more property owners and developers can capture the local 
government decision-making power, successfully organize their intense interest in gaining lucrative development 
approvals over the dispersed interests of the majority of existing residents, and persuade their state legislature to 
pass statutes that are favorable to development and remove the authority of local governments.  See Dana, supra
note 13, at 1271-74.  Carol Rose has characterized as “localism bashing” the pessimistic conception of local 
government regulators as thoughtless objects of majoritarian influence.   See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, 
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-32 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
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At the same time, individual property owners needing discretionary approval for specific 
and singular changes to their existing land use may be less able to gain the political leverage 
necessary to counteract a local government’s efforts to exact extortionate concessions.150  These 
are the kinds of property owners on whose side the Court intervened in Nollan and Dolan: 
individual plaintiffs who owned relatively modest amounts of property, who were unable to find 
similar property elsewhere, and who seemed especially vulnerable to political majorities.151  But 
the decisions’ formalist conception of property ownership as a single category for purposes of 
takings jurisprudence provides the greatest legal leverage and commercial advantage to those 
who need the Court’s protections least—large scale developers who can purchase land in 
different jurisdictions within a region, and who are quite capable of exercising their exit option 
and of protecting themselves politically. 
In situations where jurisdictions compete for development and property owners may exit 
with relative ease or successfully engage in political lobbying, the Court’s story of powerful, 
unchecked local governments is less accurate and persuasive, and the heightened judicial 
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan therefore may be not only unnecessary but also intrusive and 
overly protective of wealthy, powerful interests.152  Nevertheless, some localities offer such 
attractive natural or geographical amenities that their local governments may ignore their
150
 Prior to Nollan and Dolan, state courts were able to make this distinction between large scale development 
interests and vulnerable small property owners.  In one instance, a court declared that a more rigorous standard of 
review of exactions was appropriate for challenges by individual property owners, on the assumption both that the 
approval sought by a subdivider would have more impact on the community and that the subdivider would be less 
vulnerable to majoritarian exploitation.  See Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 864, 868 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1976).
151
 Many of the Court’s takings decisions expanding property rights protections were litigated by the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, who represented the Nollans and Dolans before Supreme Court.  See generally Douglas T. Kendall & 
Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 509, 539-42 (1998) (chronicling and criticizing the role of conservative legal advocacy groups in 
finding sympathetic plaintiffs and litigating takings cases).
152 See Smith, supra note 35, at 30.
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competition and may not care—or indeed may hope—that new entrants will be scared away by a 
rigorous regulatory regime.153  In such instances, those already-located developers and property 
owners are “stuck” without an easy exit option from an unfriendly jurisdiction.154  The dynamics 
of local governance and property ownership may thereby render individual plaintiffs especially 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of majoritarian political sentiment and administrative 
overreaching.155  Accordingly, judicial scrutiny may be more necessary in some contexts and 
unnecessarily intrusive and disruptive in others.  
Attending to such variability and complexity of what Margaret Radin has called the 
“recalcitrant practice” of property—“the stubborn situatedness of people and their property, and 
the endless variations in property relations”156—is not a part of the Court’s approach, however.  
The Court’s narrative of land use regulation relies on relatively stock figures of nearly 
omnipotent government agencies and besieged property owners.  The Court tells this story from 
an individual rights-based perspective with a utilitarian flavor that ignores issues of 
progressivity,157 sustainability, environmental aesthetics, and social and environmental justice.158
As a result, the Court’s solution to this narrative is a powerful doctrinal shield for the victims of 
a widespread regulatory onslaught that may only exist in certain places at certain times.  The 
Court assumes that only a sufficiently robust—and, as the next section explains, sufficiently 
153 See Dana, supra note 13, at 1271 n.129,
154 EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 184-85.
155 See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 4-5, 9 (arguing that exit is not as available as an option at the local level as it is at 
the state or federal level); but see Rose, supra note 149, at 1134-35 (arguing that exit is at least equally available at 
the local, state, and federal levels).
156
 Radin, supra note 12, at 265.
157 See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741,781-90 (1999) (offering a progressive, 
egalitarian conception of takings that considers the socioeconomic status of the affected landowner).
158 See generally Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 83-88 
(2003) (listing and detailing various ethical impulses developed in the field of environmental ethics).
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formal—constitutional regime can limit the regulatory tendencies of overreaching local 
governments.
C. Nexus and Proportionality as Rule-Based Commands.
Admittedly, Nollan and Dolan articulate less clear rules than those commanding courts to 
find virtually per se takings in regulations that result in the total deprivation of all economic use 
of land or its permanent physical occupation.  The mere imposition of an exaction does not effect 
a taking; instead, courts must apply the nexus and proportionality tests to decide whether 
compensation is due.  Furthermore, as I explained above,159 the category of exactions to which 
Nollan and Dolan apply is subject to a significant amount of confusion.160  Nevertheless, they 
represent a similar effort to create stability and replicable precision for the judicial review of 
exactions.161  But like the Court’s other formal, categorical takings tests, the nexus and 
proportionality tests represent a clear desire to circumscribe judicial discretion in reviewing 
exactions, and to do so in order further to establish broad protections for property rights and for 
the conception of property generally.   
Nollan and Dolan circumscribe discretion in two ways.  First, the “essential nexus” and 
“rough proportionality” tests require courts to apply focused and finite logic to the specific 
impacts and mitigation on the subject property.162  As such, they differ strikingly from the 
159 See supra Part II.C.
160
 Of course, the Lucas category of takings is also subject to a certain degree of uncertainty because of issues 
surrounding the valuation and denominator of the subject parcel.  See text accompanying supra notes ___
161 See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1446 (associating Dolan with Lucas to the extent that both 
attempt to formalize takings law, but do so incrementally and imperfectly).
162
 Implicit in my argument is the assumption that when it established its federal constitutional rules to review 
exactions in Nollan and Dolan, the Court had some choice, and that choice included a more open-ended inquiry that 
resembled its ad hoc balancing test in Penn Central.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91 (choosing among different state 
court tests, and rejecting deferential “reasonable relationship” standard).  As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the 
Court in Dolan assumed, without proof, that it could simply adopt any test that state courts had developed—largely 
based on state constitutional or unenumerated grounds and generally not on federal constitutional grounds—as 
though that were the universe of proper choices for a new federal constitutional rule.  Id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In short, the Court could have chosen to adopt the reasonable relationship test, or even simply applied 
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comparatively open-ended inquiry of Penn Central, where the Court admitted its inability to 
develop “any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic 
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government.”163  Together, the nexus and 
proportionality tests consider the direct causal relationship between the harm of the proposed 
new use for the property, the regulation upon which the government relies in requiring the 
challenged concessions, and the cost of the concessions and the likelihood that the concessions 
would mitigate the harms.164  These tests narrow judicial review of exactions, focusing on harm 
causation and abatement as the basis of exactions’ constitutional permissibility.  Put another 
way, the Court has declared that exactions to which Nollan and Dolan apply do not require 
compensation when they are directed at and address the harms of the proposed land use, because 
it is only when local governments so limit their exactions that they are not extorting rights from 
property owners.  In this scheme, harm causation and harm reduction serve both as the basis and 
limit of exactions as a regulatory practice.  To require more or different, in the Court’s view, is 
both to overregulate beyond the basis of legitimate land use planning and to effect a taking by 
going “too far.”165  Property rights advocates propose extending the rigorous, limiting logic of 
this regulatory ceiling to all regulatory takings cases.166
Second and more significantly, Nollan and Dolan also provide direction in the form of 
metrics to apply to the exaction’s nexus and proportionality to the proposed land use.167  Of 
Penn Central’s ad hoc balancing test, but instead chose the more precise and confining nexus and proportionality 
tests.
163
 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).  
164 See Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction 
Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 893 (1995) (explaining that a central inquiry in Dolan "involves causation: 
does the exaction relate to the harm ‘caused’ by the new development?").
165 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
166 See Kmiec, supra note 95, at 1045.
167 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 
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course, neither metric is exceptionally clear; indeed, each couples a fairly precise term—in 
Nollan the adjective “essential” and in Dolan “proportional”—with an imprecise one—Nollan’s 
“nexus” and Dolan’s “roughly.”  But these combinations do not signify the Court’s desire to 
obfuscate or be imprecise.  In Dolan, for example, the Court explicitly rejected less precise 
metrics developed in state courts that required “very generalized statements as to the necessary 
connection between the required dedication and the proposed development” and were “too lax to 
adequately protect petitioner’s right to just compensation.”168  Although the Court rejected as 
“too exacting” a strict “uniquely attributable” test that would have required courts to measure 
precisely the exaction against the proposed land use’s harms,169 it commanded lower courts to 
measure exactions with a particular metric.  Similarly, the Court in Nollan rejected as lacking 
essential nexus a condition that “utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for 
the prohibition.”170  Although wary of establishing a precise command, the Court clearly hoped 
to provide some clear, rule-like protection for property owners.
Each decision thus carves out a specific set of judicial inquiries that provides a focused, 
limited set of considerations (compare the condition to the purpose of the regulation and measure 
the condition to the impact) and relatively clear, if not quite crystalline, computations for courts 
to make (“essential” and “roughly proportional”).171  The argument that Nollan and Dolan’s tests 
are “hardly beacons of clarity” in form, force, or application172 rests on the false assumption that 
the category “rule” contains only simple, non-discretionary, non-contingent commands.  But no 
(citation omitted) (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, 
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”).
168 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.  See supra Part II.A (describing pre-Nollan state court tests for exactions).
169 See supra note 55.
170 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
171 Cf. Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 
148 (1995) (praising Nollan and Dolan for establishing an “objective standard” for whether a taking has occurred).
172
 Poirier, supra note 14, at 107 n.55.
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such absolute command can exist.  Rules and standards operate in relation, not in absolute 
contrast, to each other.173  Considered closely, the rule versus standard binary does not hold;174
instead, commands may be more or less particularistic, and more or less rule-based.175 Nollan
and Dolan provide significantly greater direction and content to courts than an open-ended ad 
hoc balancing or reasonable relationship test,176 and in their efforts to do so demonstrate the 
same desire for formal stability demonstrated in Loretto and Lucas.177  A permanent physical 
invasion effects a taking; total diminution of value is likely to effect a taking; and an exaction 
that bears no essential nexus or that is not roughly proportional to the impacts of a regulated land 
use effects a taking.  Notwithstanding their somewhat open texture, Nollan and Dolan limit 
judicial discretion by prescribing what factors courts may consider when reviewing exactions for 
alleged takings, and how courts may consider them.
D. Nollan, Dolan, and the Doctrinal Bias Towards Regulatory Formulas.
At minimum, in at least some jurisdictions the exactions cases have likely affected 
substantive decisionmaking and the costs of the regulatory review process.178 Nollan and 
173 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 593-96 (1992).
174 See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 (1985) (characterizing the rule/ 
standard binary as performing little more than an “arrested dialectic”).
175 FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES  52, 77-78, 113 (1991); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 46 (1987).
176 See generally Kaplow, supra note 173, at 621 (distinguishing rules, which give content to the law before those 
subject to it act, from standards, which give content afterward).
177 See Heller, supra note 118, at 1219-20.
178 See DANIEL POLLAK, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND 
USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 31, 82-83 (California Research Bureau, CRB-00-004, 2000); Jonathan M. Davidson 
& Adam U. Lindgren, Exactions and Impact Fees--Nollan/Dolan: Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW. 427 
(1997); Ryan, supra note 37, at 368.  Such costs may be borne by, or shared with, the property owner, thereby 
raising the cost of development.  See id. at 366; c.f. Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce, 991 P.2d at 1080 
(upholding city ordinance requiring land owner-applicant to submit civil or traffic engineer’s report demonstrating 
that applicant could not be required to provide road, drainage, and sidewalk easements for land improvements, 
because such requirements would not be roughly proportional to the estimated impact of the development).  One 
guide for land use attorneys suggests that counsel for developers or property owners hire their own economic 
consultants in preparation for litigation over the essential nexus and rough proportionality of any exaction required 
in the approval or development agreement process.  See Michael C. Spata, Decision-makers and the Administrative 
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Dolan’s commands can apply to exactions imposed as part of a wide variety of land use 
regulatory decisions, including those regarding subdivision approvals, rezoning, and 
annexation.179  In states that had previously engaged in more deferential judicial review of 
exactions, local governments that failed to comply with Nollan and Dolan, or local governments 
that developed constitutionally permissible exactions but had failed to produce a sufficiently 
detailed record to demonstrate compliance with Nollan and Dolan, have needed to change their 
regulatory practices or face an increased likelihood of takings liability in light of Nollan and 
Dolan.  
Nollan and Dollan have also raised the risk of litigation and the incidence of property 
owners’ threats to sue.180  A recent study of city and county planners in California found that 
litigation threats have increased since Nollan, Dolan, and other important recent takings cases 
expanding the rights of property owners to be compensated for regulatory takings.181 Those 
California counties that have instituted strong growth controls, as well as the fastest growing 
California cities, have been more likely to face an increased number of threats of litigation than 
pro-growth counties and slower growing cities.182  Local governments bear the full risk183 of 
Decision, in HOW TO LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE: STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TACTICS 55, 61 (Larry J. Smith ed., 
2000).
179 See generally  Jonathan M. Davidson et al., “Where’s Dolan?”:  Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 
684-86 (1998).
180 See Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications—Local Government Responses to Nollan/ 
Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON L. REV. 675, 677 (2000) (describing property owners’ negotiation stances 
post-Dolan as changing from a “let’s make a deal” approach to a “let’s make a claim” approach); Douglas T. 
Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep 
Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1815 (1995).  It perhaps goes without saying that threats to litigate can and 
do result in lawsuits.  See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 21-22.
181 See id. at 16-17 (finding that more than half of the planners in counties that responded to survey reported a 
marked increase in the number of threats of litigation in recent years and over the past decade); see also id. at 18 
(reporting that such threats occur especially frequently when municipalities consider discretionary approvals for 
intensification of land use, whether in the form of zoning changes, subdivision approvals, conditional use permits, or 
variances). 
182 See id. at 125-29.  
183 See id. at 23 (discussing the unavailability of takings insurance for municipalities in California). 
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compensating the property owner for an exaction found to be unconstitutional as well as for 
attorney’s fees;184 they may also be liable for compensation covering the temporary period dating 
back to the imposition of the prohibited exaction.185  Threats to sue are therefore likely to have 
some effect on decisionmaking.  
Unsurprisingly, many jurisdictions have modified their regulatory behavior by 
demanding more modest exactions or by changing the way in which the exactions they impose 
are calculated.186 Although Dolan did not require a precise “mathematical calculation” in order 
to meet its rough proportionality test,187 courts have required local governments to adopt and 
apply fairly rigorous standards with defensible, continually updated methodologies and estimates 
in order to support the concessions they exact from property owners.188  Even where local 
governments review extensive engineering and planning reports before imposing an exaction, 
184
 This assumes the property owner has filed suit under some statutory provision, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that 
allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees.
185 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) 
(establishing right of property owner to compensation for “the period during which the taking was effective”).
186 See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 125-29. 
187 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
188 See, e.g., Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Minn. 1997) (striking down impact fee 
system on the grounds that the system by which fees were assessed was not periodically updated); F. & W. Assoc. v. 
County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (upholding traffic impact fees based on 
study that devised volume-capacity ratios, measured the demand volume and existing road capacity, projected 
impacts from development based on industry standards and empirical data, suggested roadway improvements to 
mitigate impacts, and estimated costs of improvements).  The threat of heightened scrutiny has raised the costs of
performing such studies.  See Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Fifth Amendment Takings Clause—California 
Court of Appeal Finds Nollan’s and Dolan’s Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance—
Home Builders Ass’n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2058, 2061 & n.33 (2002) (estimating current cost of nexus studies sufficient to comply with Nollan and 
Dolan to be between $20,000 and $35,000); Edward J. Sullivan, Dolan and Municipal Risk Assessment, 12 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 1-2 (1997) (discussing increased cost of compliance following Dolan).  Such costs may be 
passed on to developers in requirements that they pay for all environmental review of the proposed development.  
See Ryan, supra note 37, at 366-67 (reporting increased compliance costs in Tigard, Oregon, following Dolan
decision, passed along to developers); Clyde W. Forrest, Planned Unit Development and Takings Post Dolan, 15 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (1995) (noting that the evidence required for studies required to support exactions is 
often borne by developers).  Like the impact fees themselves, such costs are either passed backward to landowners 
by developers in a lower price they pay for undeveloped land, or forward to new home purchasers in higher prices 
for new homes, or are borne by developers themselves, depending upon a variety of market factors.  See supra note 
47 (discussing research on who bears the costs of impact fees).
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courts have nevertheless dismissed the municipality’s findings of rough proportionality.189
Indeed, Dolan itself rejected as constitutionally unacceptable a bicycle path exaction, despite the 
city of Tigard’s mathematical calculation of the increased number of car trips the proposed store 
expansion would create and a rough estimate of the decreased traffic congestion that the 
completed bikepath would produce.190
As a result, in the years following Nollan and Dolan, local governments have shifted their 
exactions practice towards imposing impact fees rather than in-kind exactions, especially those 
that require the dedication of land.191  Two doctrinal issues in Nollan and Dolan favor this shift.  
First, under a narrow reading of Nollan and Dolan’s reach, certain methods of imposing impact 
fees are less likely to face heightened scrutiny than ad hoc, dedicatory exactions.192  When 
derived before the fact in an impact fee ordinance and then applied to all similarly situated 
property owners, exactions formulas establish a legislative, rather than adjudicative, basis for 
189 See e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 391 (III. App. Dist. 1995) (ruling defendant 
municipality’s requiring a dedication of land as condition of issuance of a special use permit failed to meet rough
proportionality test); Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (overturning and 
remanding to county conditions placed on subdivision approval, despite findings that local officials found had met 
rough proportionality standard).
190 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395; cf. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (upholding parks 
and recreation impact fee under Dolan because county had provided a detailed, individualized study of the need for 
more park land).
191 Compare Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45, at 137-38 (noting that in recent years following Nollan and Dolan, 
California cities and counties have shifted towards applying legislated fees, rather than individualized land 
dedications, in their exactions), with Elizabeth D. Purdum & James E. Frank, Community Use of Exactions: Results 
of a National Survey, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 34, at 128, Table 6-5 (results of a 1985 study of 
exactions practice in local governments finding that the exactions applied as part of the approval process were 
predominantly flexible, rather than based on set formulas), and MESHENBERG, supra note 23, at 48 (pre-Nollan and 
Dolan discussion of exactions process noting that although subdivision regulations may include formulas to 
calculate exactions, “negotiation is in reality an intimate part of the subdivision approval process” as local 
governments and developers seek to trade entitlements for quick and mutually beneficial approvals).  See also
Stephen P. Chinn et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard: Kansas Local Governments Beware—The Supreme Court Further 
Restricts the Authority of Municipalities to Condition Development Approvals, J. KAN. BAR ASS’N, Nov. 1995, at 
30, 37 (predicting a shift towards impact fee ordinances and away from individualized, in-kind dedications in 
exactions practice).  The development of impact fees as a general approach predated Dolan, however.  In states that 
applied a deferential test to challenged exactions, jurisdictions have long favored fees to mitigate certain types of 
impacts for which land dedication was inappropriate, or for projects on small land areas with no land to dedicate.  
See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, The Legal Issues of Capital Facilities Funding, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC 
SERVICES, supra note 40, at 51, 52-53.
192 See supra Part II.C.2.
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imposing exactions, thereby arguably avoiding the scope of Nollan and Dolan.193  Even better, 
when such fees are imposed under the authority of state law,194 they may seem even more likely 
to be fairly derived and imposed, insofar as the state statute may require nexus and 
proportionality findings195 and property owners in other jurisdictions within the state may also be 
subject to similar fees.196  Negotiated exactions appear perilous when compared to such 
formulaic, legislated fees.197
Second, even if heightened scrutiny applies, formulaic exactions are more likely to 
withstand the nexus and proportionality tests.  Exactions designed using widely accepted 
methodologies, such as those developed to calculate the costs and mitigation of the traffic and 
school impacts of new development, appear less assailable as unproportional.198  Mathematical 
formulas whose scale responds directly to predictable and quantifiable impacts and that are 
quantified in terms of the dollar costs of harms and mitigation, seem likely to be more persuasive 
to courts that either lack expertise in the area of land use planning or are protective of property 
owners.199  Furthermore, because more complex equations within formulas can include 
193 See id.
194
 Almost half of the states have authorized impact fees.  See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 9.21
195 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66001(a)(3), 66005(c) (West 2003) (requiring “reasonable relationship between 
the fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed,” and codifying “constitutional and 
decisional” law); TEX. LOC. GOV’T ANN. CODE §§ 395.001(4), 395.014(3) (West 2002) (authorizing only impact 
fees that fund capital improvements “necessitated by and attributable to . . . new development”).
196
 The Texas impact fee statute itself establishes a maximum fee.  See TEX. LOC. GOV’T ANN. CODE §§ 395.015.
197
 Bosselman, supra note 145, at 350 (“[I]f negotiation with the developer creates a risk of liability for the city that 
does not exist if the city imposes a flat fee, the city lawyer is likely to discourage such negotiations.”).
198 See WILLIAM B. FULTON, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 227-300 (1999); see, e.g., JAMES C. NICHOLAS, THE 
CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-SHARE IMPACT FEES 23-34 (American Planning Association Planning Advisory 
Service Report Number 408, 1988) (reproducing calculations used by various local governments to establish fee 
formulas to mitigate traffic, schools, parks, and library impacts of new development).
199 See NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 37, at 36 (stating that properly derived impact fees are less likely to be affected 
by Supreme Court exactions cases because of “the preciseness and sophistication with which economic analysis can 
be applied”); Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45, at 137-38.  They may also seem fairer to property owners.  See
POLLAK, supra note 178, at 87 (noting more respondents to survey noted challenges to individualized exactions than 
to generally applicable fees).
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individualized assessments of the impacts of a particular proposed land use, such formulas will 
appear more likely to calculate rough proportionality.200
Third, once a municipality develops impact fee and exactions formulas, they serve as 
administratively simple regulatory practices that can be used repeatedly for similar, recurring 
development applications.  In order to attract development, progrowth communities have long 
established exaction schemes in advance to create a predictable and palatable project approval 
regime.201  Legislative formulas applied mechanically can settle disputes wholesale, as opposed 
to the more time-consuming and variable approach of designing individualized exactions.202
Municipalities may establish such formulas in, or based upon, comprehensive, long-range plans, 
another factor likely to be persuasive to courts insofar as they therefore would appear more likely 
to be part of an ordered, considered regulatory scheme rather than an effort to extort concessions 
from individual landowners.203
Exactions practice at the local level has thereby become more cautious, systematic, and 
related to pre-formulated planning decisions.204  Pushing local governments towards long-range, 
comprehensive planning based on mathematical formulas is a fairly ironic, though not 
unexpected,205 result of the Court’s exactions cases.  In its logic and effects—testing for 
proportionality and nexus, which leads to mathematical, legislative formulas—the Supreme 
Court’s formalist approach to the constitutional law of exactions appears analogous to a certain 
200 See Roger K. Dahlstrom, Development Impact Fees: A Review of Contemporary Techniques for Calculation, 
Data Collection, and Documentation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 557, 558-59 (1995); Nelson, supra note 34, at 554-55.
201 See Deakin, supra note 40, at 103.
202 See Nelson, supra note 34, at 552-53; NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 37, at 54; see generally Kaplow, supra note 
173, at 621 (discussing efficiency advantages of rules that regulate frequently recurring conduct).
203
 See NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 37, at 143.
204 See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 81.
205 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (endorsing the “commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by 
increasing urbanization”).
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conception of planning as a discipline and practice.206  Oddly, in its effort to protect property 
owners by curbing overregulation, a conservative majority of the Supreme Court has endorsed 
and enforced the regulatory logic of planning, with its claims of modern scientific and 
engineering expertise, as a necessary intervention into the private ordering of land use.207  To 
place this irony within Bruce Ackerman’s terminology, the Court’s efforts to provide an 
Ordinary Observer’s conception of property—local governments should not extort property 
rights from owners seeking to develop their land—have resulted in the legal tests and 
administrative rules of the Scientific Policymaker.208  In the abstract, the development of 
regulatory formulas is neither necessarily bad nor necessarily good, but it does have 
consequences, affecting both the regulation of property owners and communities, and the 
practices and legitimacy of local governance.  Parts IV and V consider these consequences of 
Nollan and Dolan’s efforts to establish formal clarity in exactions and local governments’ 
legislative, formulaic response.  
IV. Formalism, Formulas, and the Variability of Local Land Use Regulation: Nollan 
and Dolan’s Consequences on Property Rights Protection and Regulatory 
Efficiency.
As formal concepts, nexus and proportionality should lead to land use regulation that 
settles and protects all property owners’ expectations of the broad extent of their property rights 
206 See Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1743-44 (1988) (noting 
that a tight linkage between mitigation required in an exaction and a proposed new project secures a measure of 
good planning and stability); Dahlstrom, supra note 200, at 569 (stating that Nollan and Dolan confirm the value of 
data collection and analysis in development impacts, and the logic of impact fee programs).  This explains why 
planners apparently approve of Nollan and Dolan in the abstract.  See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 33 (study of local 
government planners in California showing majority endorsing Nollan and Dolan as promoting “good planning 
practice”).
207
 Of course, this is only ironic insofar as planning as a discipline and profession defines itself against visions of 
unregulated land use and strong private property rights.  But at least one critic of contemporary planning condemns 
the profession for functioning as little more than utilitarian facilitators of the commodification of land development.  
See MICHAEL J. DEAR, THE POSTMODERN URBAN CONDITION 124-26 (2000).
208 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-15 (1977).
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and that requires the full internalization of all external costs produced by any proposed new land 
use.209  But given the variable political, economic, and environmental contexts of local land use 
regulation, the formal protections Nollan and Dolan aspire to establish and the formulaic 
regulations that are likely to result will not ultimately achieve the Court’s purposes of robust 
property rights protection and utilitarian curbs on municipalities’ tendencies to overregulate.  
Rather, Nollan and Dolan are more likely to lead to instances of under- and overregulation as 
local governments step further back from engaging in ample consideration of development’s 
harms, or respond by denying entitlements to property owners, or selectively ignore the Court’s 
commands.  Even local governments attempting to comply in good faith with the Court’s 
constitutional commands may engage in costly, full-scale environmental review that fully 
identifies and charges for all the anticipated harms of new development, only to face resistance 
by recalcitrant, litigious property owners and a skeptical, empowered judiciary that concludes 
such regulatory efforts effect a taking.  
In short, the Court’s effort in Nollan and Dolan to impose its desire for takings rules fail 
to provide a mechanical, universal solution to the messy diversity of locally devised and 
administered regulation and is unlikely to achieve a uniform approach sufficient to fulfill their 
dual purposes of protecting property rights and enabling more efficient regulation with rule-like 
commands.  Different local governments, working under different state laws and within specific 
economic and political contexts, faced with diverse housing markets and unique environmental 
209
 That is, if we assume that local government will seek to internalize all present and future costs that are known and 
unknown, and if we assume that such costs could pass the nexus and rough proportionality tests, then Nollan and 
Dolan could produce an ideal cost internalization akin to the assumptions of the common law trespass and nuisance 
doctrines.  See Robert H. Cutting, “One Man’s Ceilin’ Is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights As the Double-
Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819 (2001) (attempting to utilize common law doctrines to require full internalization of 
externalities).
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resources and local amenities, respond differently to the Court’s commands.210  And implicit 
within this Part and Part V, I argue that no single vision of property and takings law can suffice 
to produce the kinds of flexible, contextualized responses to the regulatory needs and political 
and social circumstances of land use disputes.211  This inherent variability not only makes the 
Court’s efforts seem simplistic or duplicitous in their willful imposition of a singular narrative of 
exploitation, but it also cannot help but undermine the Court’s formal approach.  The unruly 
ground of land use regulation and local politics lead, ultimately, to widespread, incremental 
departure from the Court’s formal commands as well as, where jurisdictions obey the Court, to 
consequences that are frustrating and disruptive to local governance.  I consider below three 
different possible adverse consequences:  more underregulation when jurisdictions attempt to 
comply with Nollan and Dolan and require insufficient exactions; more overregulation when 
jurisdictions decide to deny development proposals rather than comply with the Court’s 
commands; and no effect, when jurisdictions simply disobey the commands and continue to 
require unconstitutional concessions.
A. Result 1: Underregulation, Due to Insufficient Exactions.
When local governments—fearful of compliance and litigation costs, the risk of judicial 
review under Nollan and Dolan, and the costs of takings liability—either fail to impose an 
exaction or impose a less stringent exaction than they otherwise might, the exactions cases result 
210 See generally MICHAEL A. PAGANO & ANN O’M. BOWMAN, CITYSCAPES AND CAPITAL: THE POLITICS OF URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT 2-4 (1995) (arguing that in matters of land use and urban development, politics and political 
leadership matter and operate within local historical, social, economic, and structural contexts). 
211 See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 161, 193 
(1996); cf. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1401 (1991) (noting 
impossibility of finding unified theory of takings because “there are simply too many compelling and conflicting 
theories for any to account accurately for American attitudes toward the taking dilemma”).
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in underregulation212 that effects givings213 to property owners.214  Indeed, some jurisdictions 
have responded to Nollan and Dolan by seeking smaller concessions from property owners.215
The nexus and proportionality tests establish a ceiling to exactions bargaining; when an exaction 
requires quantitatively or qualitatively too much, the victimized property owner has a 
constitutional cause of action.  No such protection—whether in the form of a constitutional right 
to challenge an insufficient exaction or a statutory floor that would correspond with the 
constitutional ceiling—exists for those who must pay the costs or suffer the consequences of an 
exaction that requires too little of the property owner.216  Thus in imposing an exaction, a 
212
 By “underregulation” in this context I mean that the regulating agency—mostly municipalities in the land use 
context—fails to force the property owner to internalize all costs associated with all negative impacts of a proposed 
development.  Oddly, few commentators on Nollan and Dolan have considered in depth the extent to which Nollan
and Dolan are likely to lead to underregulation.  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 13, at 40-41 (only briefly considering 
underregulatory effects, while emphasizing that nexus and proportionality might actually aid neighbors); Been, 
supra note 13, at 505-06 (leaving discussion of underregulation “for another day” because the Supreme Court’s 
focus has been on developers, not the public, and because underregulation is an issue arising from the development 
approvals themselves, rather than from the exactions that are imposed as part of the approvals).  Accordingly, this 
section is longer than the two that follow, because each of those arguments—that Nollan and Dolan will lead to 
overregulation and municipalities’ refusal to comply with the Court’s commands—have been covered extensively 
by other commentators, and I largely summarize their arguments here.  See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 341-51; 
KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 106-11; Been, supra note 13, at 504 -06; Dana, supra note 13, at 1274-86; Fennell, 
supra note 13, at 33-40.
213
 “Givings” refers to the converse to “takings”—instances in which a government promulgates a regulation that 
grants benefits, rather than confiscates the property of, an identifiable individual or individuals.  See Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489 (1999).  
Givings in the exactions context occur when a local government grants a development approval but fails to require 
sufficient offsets for the development’s costs, thereby diminishing the value or enjoyment of others’ property, 
draining the public fisc, and degrading environmental resources.  The local government has thereby granted a giving 
to the developing property owner, and imposed, at least indirectly, a taking on others.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, 
supra, at 610.
214 See Davidson et al., supra note 179, at 697 (characterizing “chilling effect” on municipalities’ assertive 
exactions, leading to “increased capitulation, or perhaps to a negotiated development that is more compromising 
than that initially proposed by planning staff,” as a possible result of Nollan and Dolan).   
215
 Nearly one-half of California counties and more than one-quarter of California cities reduced impact fees and 
exactions relating to roads and traffic-related infrastructure, open space, trails, and public access to natural resources 
during the discretionary approval process in the years following Dolan.  See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 23-25.  
Anecdotal reports confirm increased anxiety among planners and local government officials regarding the 
imposition of stringent exactions, and a relaxing of bargaining demands.  See Ryan, supra note 37, at 350 n.71.
216
 Some commentators assert, without explanation, that Nollan and Dolan provide a third-party right to challenge 
regulations that fail to meet the nexus and proportionality tests.  See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 349-50; Fennell, 
supra note 13, at 40-41.  Nothing in either decision indicates the Court’s intent to create such a right; if anything, the 
Court’s narrow focus on the rights of landowners seeking regulatory approvals demonstrates its clear lack of interest 
in the rights of other affected parties.  It is the expropriation of the property owner’s land, not effects on anyone 
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municipality faces pressure on one side from the intense interests of a potential litigant who may 
be able to muster a political interest group of property owners, and, from the other side, the more 
diffuse interests of a potential political interest group united around opposition to a specific 
proposal or to certain types of development generally.  In different communities, this balance 
may tip differently, but in pro-growth or litigation risk-averse jurisdictions, Nollan and Dolan’s 
heightened scrutiny provides a powerful weapon for property owners that third parties lack, and 
will likely lead to less regulation and more unmitigated impacts.
Even assuming that in the wake of Nollan and Dolan local governments attempt to exact 
the strongest concessions from property owners, the logic and metrics of nexus and 
proportionality and the record required to demonstrate constitutional compliance may 
nevertheless lead to underregulation.  Quantitative showings of proportionality and formulas are 
imperfect as tools for mitigating the impacts of new development because impacts may be 
difficult to quantify and formulaic mitigation programs based upon future projections may not 
mitigate impacts fully.217  Some impacts and mitigation programs, such as those that study the 
effects of new development on traffic and forecast the road improvements necessary to address 
those effects, are more readily and repeatedly studied, anticipated, and quantified.  
Methodologies to establish impacts and related exactions to support improvements of drainage 
systems, bicycle infrastructure, parks, in-town pedestrian walkways and rural and exurban hiking 
else’s land, that leads the Court to apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan.  That said, state law may provide 
third parties with a cause of action for a judicial challenge of a local government’s final land use decision.  See, e.g., 
Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 7 (authorizing appeals from decisions of board of adjustment by “persons . . . 
aggrieved”); Butters v. Hauser, 960 P.2d 181 (Id. 1998) (neighboring landowner had standing to challenge ordinance 
and issuance of discretionary permit authorizing radio transmission tower that, she alleged, was in close proximity to 
her land and affected use of her electronic equipment); see generally MANDELKER, supra note 18, at §§8.02, 8.04 
(discussing third-party standing to challenge land use decisions in state court).  
217 LAWRENCE J. MEISNER, PRIVATE FUNDING FOR ROADS 5 (American Planning Association Planning Advisory 
Report No. 426, 1990); Dahlstrom, supra note 200, at 564.
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trails are less precise and reliable, and may be unable to withstand heightened scrutiny.218
Impacts to wetlands may be exceptionally difficult and expensive to mitigate, and may therefore 
fail to pass muster under Dolan.219  Even those impacts that have been studied and modeled 
extensively, like impacts on traffic, may be better addressed through mitigation programs that 
lack clear nexus, such as contributions to mass transit programs or other alternative 
transportation programs.220  Such mitigation programs are often not explicitly and entirely tied to 
the proposed development, and it may be difficult to prove or quantify the nexus and 
proportionality between the mitigation program’s benefits and the new development’s harms.221
But some, or even many, local governments may not even attempt to require mitigation 
of all impacts from development.  Local land use mitigation typically focuses on anthropocentric 
impacts that have more political salience among voters, such as traffic, schools, and recreational 
facilities.222  It tends to ignore or insufficiently consider the indirect costs of development, such 
as the costs of traffic congestion and air pollution.223  Except where required by federal and state 
218 See Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the 
Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 399, 431 (2001); Carlson & Pollak, 
supra note 45, at 134-36; Dana, supra note 13, at 1268; Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal Strategies 
for Imposing Valid Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS, 
supra note 34, at 21, 29.  See, e.g. Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 82, at 444-48 (demonstrating the difficulty of 
meeting Dolan through Jackson, Wyoming’s pre-Dolan practice of requiring new subdivisions along Flat Creek to 
donate a ten-foot public fishing easement along the stream bank for environmental and public recreational 
purposes).  Planners and local governments have nevertheless attempted to develop analyses for impacts that are 
more difficult to quantify, such as the impacts of new development on parks and recreational facilities.  See, e.g., 
Trimen, 877 P.2d at 189, 194 (upholding imposition of park impact fee imposed in lieu of land dedication, 
authorized by state statute, where fee calculated the number of dedicated acres of recreational parkland per new 
entrant into the community based on current needs, and established a fee based on the cost of the dedicated land); 
NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 37, at 188-94 (offering model park impact fee ordinance).
219 See Dana, supra note 13, at 1284.
220 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395 (holding that bike path easement effected a taking because findings only 
demonstrated that the path could rather than will or is likely to offset increase in traffic from hardware store 
expansion); see generally Dana, supra note 13, at 1278-80 (explaining that commuter bus mitigation for new 
development likely would not meet heightened scrutiny).
221 See id.
222 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.090(7) (2003) (limiting state authority to impose impact fees to road 
building, schools, parks, open space, recreation areas, and fire stations).
223 See Been, supra note 48, at 614.
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environmental law,224 some local governments are more likely to discount potential 
environmental impacts, especially those that will spillover into other communities and those that 
incrementally but cumulatively cause significant impacts.225  Local governments may not have 
the political will to consider, identify, and require mitigation of such impacts, especially in the 
costly manner required under Nollan and Dolan.
Consider, too, the dynamic Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny establishes between 
judicial review and legislative prerogative.  Determining a “roughly proportional” width of an 
emergency access road or impact fee for the provision of fire service is an exceptionally difficult 
and risky endeavor, especially where the issue before the local government is whether to require 
an access road at all.226  When a property owner’s mitigation of impacts would be 
disproportionately burdensome—when, for example, construction of an emergency access road 
is exorbitantly expensive—local governments and residents may be unable under Nollan and 
Dolan to force mitigation.227  Moreover, as one court recently held, where the required 
emergency access road would be in an undeveloped area and would remain unfinished until the 
surrounding parcels are developed, a local government may be unable to meet Nollan and 
Dolan’s burdens if it fails to prove to a court’s satisfaction that the emergency road would be 
224
 The plethora of relevant federal environmental statutes, and the complicated relationship among federal and state 
environmental law and local land use and environmental law, are beyond the scope of this Article.  See Nancy 
Perkins Spyke, The Land Use—Environmental Law Distinction: A Geo-Feminist Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 55 (2002); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the “Impenetrable Jungle”: Navigating the Boundary Between 
Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996).
225 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 593-94 (1997) (noting tendency of regulators to fail to disaggregate incremental 
but cumulatively significant impacts); Reynolds, supra note 97, at 566-69 (explaining importance of considering 
cumulative impacts to which a single project may contribute in land use decisions).  Some local governments are 
increasingly getting involved in wetlands protection, as well as other areas (most prominently the protection of open 
space and historic preservation) that had previously been the domain of federal and state governments.  See John R. 
Nolon, The Importance of Local Environmental Law, 5 PACE CENTER FOR ENVTL. L. STUDIES J. 1, 4 (2001).
226 See Faus, supra note 180, at 688.
227 See Dana, supra note 13, at 1284.
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completed in the “foreseeable future.”228  On those grounds, the court ultimately overruled the 
local government regarding the construction of the access road, and the property owner was able 
to subdivide his land without dedicating a road suitable for emergency services.229  In this 
respect, the proportionality test invites courts to perform a rough cost-benefit analysis—generally 
a legislative, rather than judicial prerogative—to consider whether a costly concession for 
mitigation is somehow proportional to the benefit it would provide.230  Given Nollan and 
Dolan’s heightened scrutiny and bias in favor of protecting property rights, the cost-benefit 
analysis courts undertake is unlikely to encompass the full range and extent either of a 
development’s impacts or of the kinds of considerations that a local government takes into 
account in imposing exactions.231
Nollan and Dolan’s formal logic is also likely to lead local governments to conceptual 
errors that will cause underregulation.  As a general matter, current dominant regulatory 
practices too deeply discount the occurrence and cost of future harms, assuming only that 
presently discernible impacts need to be considered and mitigated.232  Fixed regulatory formulas 
may lead regulators to underestimate both the dynamic nature of property across time and the 
relative uniqueness of any particular piece of land in its geographic location, environmental 
228
 Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
229
 After the county had won the property owner’s administrative appeal of the county’s imposition of the exaction, a 
trial court had reversed and remanded the decision on the grounds that had the county had “failed to make an 
individualized determination that [the exacted road] related both in nature and extent to the impacts from the 
proposed development, as required to demonstrate 'rough proportionality' under the holding in Dolan. . . .”   Id. at 
348.  On remand, the county examiner, reconsidering the property owner’s appeal found that the county failed to 
meet Dolan’s test and approved the property owner’s subdivision plat without the exacted road.  See id.  The 
intermediate state appellate court affirmed the county examiner’s decision.  See id. at 358.
230 Cf. Driesen, supra note 225, at 610-12 (arguing that weighing costs and benefits is a normative, political activity 
and therefore a role for legislatures rather than administrative agencies).
231 Cf. Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a New EPA 
Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1999) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis for its failure to 
consider full range of issues and values implicated in environmental decisions).
232 See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999).
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resources, and relationship to its surroundings.233  A regulatory approach that works at one time 
and in one place by imposing a certain set of exactions on a particular land use may not work 
later when existing and newly approved activities further deplete common pool resources.  An 
existing formula, and judicial skepticism and governmental fear about making that formula more 
rigorous, may foreclose later responses to the decreasing supply of essential resources to serve 
all property within the jurisdiction.234  Flexible, timely responses to the conditions causing 
increasingly scarce or congested resources are essential political decisions that governments 
make; the role of takings jurisprudence is to protect the individual from exceptional unfairness as 
a result of the transition to a new land use regime,235 not to prevent such decisions being made in 
the first place.  A constitutional logic leading to regulatory formulas that cannot adapt to local, 
regional, and national environmental changes ultimately provides greater individual property 
rights than the Constitution requires, and as a result adversely affects political, social, and 
environmental values made vulnerable to the entitlements these formulas create.236
In addition, the Nollan and Dolan approach, like that of common law nuisance, focuses 
largely on the off-site impacts of development on common pool resources and public goods 
(such as traffic and schools) that affect other residents and the natural and built environment that 
surrounds the subject land.  But even if impacts on the land outside the boundaries of the subject 
233 See Reynolds, supra note 97, at 563-66 (noting the unpredictability of negative land use impacts due to the 
likelihood of quite varied site- and project-specific characteristics); Wegner, supra note 29, at 960 (noting benefits 
of land use dealing as enabling individually crafted solutions to the specific characteristics and problems of a 
proposed site on a particular parcel).
234 See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV.
1, 18.  Rose considers the possibility of “zipping back” property rights across the board by imposing the more 
rigorous current regime on existing structures and land uses, but dismisses the idea both for its economic 
consequences in tearing down or retrofitting existing structures and its likely demoralizing effects on a wider 
populace.  Id. at 19.
235
 Rose, supra note 149, at 1151.
236 See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112-13 (1981) 
(arguing that rather than protection against the loss of property rights, the Constitution protects political rights in 
property, or “exposure to sudden changes in the major elements and crucial determinants of one’s established 
position in the world, as one has come to understand that position”).
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property are entirely internalized, a new development may not be sustainable over the long run 
on the land for which it is proposed.  Owners seeking to intensify the use of their land may have 
incomplete information about their own long-term land use or may simply not care about the 
sustainability of their land under its proposed use.237   Limiting exactions to off-site externalities 
will also lead to the overprotection of property rights within the property owner’s parcel and 
produce what Michael Heller has called an “anticommons” in which a powerful right to exclude 
results in preventing the public from utilizing a rare and valuable resource at all.238  Considered 
this way, the California Coastal Commission’s requirement that the Nollans cede a lateral beach 
easement sought to prevent a tragedy of the anticommons by excluding the public from access to 
the beach and public trust lands.  The Court’s conclusion that the exaction effected a taking 
recognized an overbroad right in a specific legal thing—the Nollans’ absolute, constitutionally 
protected right to exclude the public from a particularly inviting part of their property—that 
prevents an optimal social level of beach use.239
Because of their very nature, some impacts and some mitigation programs simply do not 
lend themselves to the logic of Nollan and Dolan.  If a local government cannot, or lacks 
confidence in its ability to, prepare a record sufficient to withstand the heightened scrutiny of the 
exactions cases, then a new land use will inevitably effect some degree of a giving to the 
property owner and pass along some of the costs of development to others.
B. Result 2: More Permissible Regulation, Due to Denials without Exactions.
237 See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR OUR PLANETARY SURVIVAL 26-42 (1993); Eric 
T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmentation, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 329 (2002).  
238 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
239 See Heller, supra note 118, at 1209-10.
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But in some jurisdictions, Nollan and Dolan may have the opposite effect.  Fearful of the 
risks and costs of litigation, local governments may decide not to bargain with property owners 
over discretionary approvals, deciding instead to deny proposals that will be politically 
unpopular or costly to the community without exactions that might be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge.240  A denial that leaves the subject property with sufficient value and 
use and that does not frustrate the owner’s reasonable investment backed expectations will likely 
not lose a constitutional challenge under the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test.241  Although a 
developer or property owner might choose an expensive condition over an outright denial, the 
fear of Nollan and Dolan may keep local governments from offering such conditions, or from 
offering conditional approvals to developers who are more likely to sue.242  Rigid, legislatively 
enacted formulas may be especially frustrating for developers and property owners because such 
formulas can be difficult to change, even in the face of weakening markets, unlike more flexible 
bargains with amenable governments.243   To the extent that Nollan and Dolan diminish local 
governments’ willingness to bargain, the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests restrict 
property owners’ ability to negotiate with a willing partner to a mutually agreeable position, and 
240
 The Court in Nollan explicitly assumed that the Coastal Commission could have denied the plaintiffs’ application 
for a building permit.  See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.  At oral argument in Dolan, the plaintiffs conceded that the city 
could have denied their building permit, which Justice Stevens confirmed in his dissent.  See Oral Argument, Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 1994 WL 664939, at *4 (Mar. 23, 1994); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241
 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
242
 This irony has led one commentator to condemn Nollan and Dolan for creating “the worst of both worlds” 
insofar as they leave untouched local governments’ broad authority under their police powers to deny development 
proposals while tightening restrictions on bargaining around or away that authority.  See Fennell, supra note 13, at 
4-5.
243 ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 56. Developers operating in anti-growth jurisdictions may 
prefer negotiated exactions over inflexible, generally applicable exaction schemes which, by avoiding heightened 
scrutiny as legislative enactments, may prove to be overinclusive and more costly.  See Dana, supra note 13, at 
1293.
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thereby leave them in a worse position than when they might at least have been able to bargain 
their way to a more expansive use.244
This unintended consequence of the exactions cases is more likely to occur in certain 
circumstances.  Where mitigation of the impacts on an especially sensitive resource is expensive, 
for example, a local government might be loathe to require (because a property owner may be 
unwilling to pay) the cost of full mitigation, and is likely to deny the proposal.245 Nollan and 
Dolan would ban creative deals in which, instead of mitigating the impact, the property owner 
would provide some unconnected, less expensive, but politically popular offset.246  Similarly, 
where a proposed project is politically unpopular and mitigation of its negative impacts is 
insufficient to persuade the political majority, the offer of an unrelated but attractive and roughly 
proportional amenity by the property owner may bring about an approval.247  A local government 
244 See KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 111; FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 348-49; Jerome S. Kayden, Zoning for 
Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (1991).  As Lee Ann Fennell notes, the Court has thereby, and unwittingly, taken a stick 
out of property owners’ bundle of rights.  See Fennell, supra note 13, at 50.  Moreover, property owners could claim 
that in some instances the Court’s nuisance-abatement approach fails to take into account the benefits that a 
proposed project can bring to the community.  To take these benefits into account, the Court could have instead 
utilized a cost-benefit analysis that would require the government to offset the development’s community benefits 
against the exaction.  (Of course, local governments might then claim that they should be able to offset the value of 
an approval and any regulatory givings to the property owner as part of its mathematical estimate of rough 
proportionality.)   A community that benefits from a development can therefore still require costly mitigation of the 
development’s harms, even where the cost of mitigation is less than the community’s benefits, so long as the 
mitigation meets the nexus and proportionality requirements.  Put another way, “under Dolan, a ‘proportional’ 
solution need only be proportional to gross harms, not net harms, generated by the development.”  Id. at 33-34, 38.  
From the property owner’s perspective, this too constitutes a form of government rent-seeking that results in 
overregulation.
245
 Been, supra note 13, at 544 (noting that "the remedy for the harm may be more costly than the value of 
preventing the harm," and using hypothetical example of shade thrown by tall office building onto public park as a 
negative impact that cannot be effectively mitigated). 
246
 Kayden, supra note 244, at 48; William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights 
Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 105 (1987).  Nollan’s nexus requirement limits the scope of exactions 
bargaining, even when a court might agree that the unrelated offset passes Dolan’s rough proportionality test by 
costing apparently the same or less than the harm the new land use would produce.  See COOTER, supra note 33, at 
302; FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 348-49.  William Fischel has proposed that limiting the community’s initial 
entitlements to the cost of eliminating nuisance spillovers and protecting such entitlements by a property rule would 
lead local governments and property owners to negotiate in order to maximize each other’s benefits, especially 
where mitigation will be expensive and imperfect.  See Fischel, supra, at 109.
247 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 31; Fischel, supra note 246, at 101-05.
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that would require or even accept amenity that lacks an essential nexus runs the risk of facing a 
property owner’s challenge under Nollan.248  Finally, jurisdictions that have failed adequately to 
force internalization of earlier developments may experience a political backlash against growth 
due to adverse transportation, environmental, school, or recreational conditions.  With existing 
capital facility deficits, local governments may not wish to approve projects that only internalize 
their new harms.249
In sum, the risk-averse jurisdiction that might otherwise be willing to bargain to an 
approval is likely to deny a proposal that threatens to create harms.  To the extent that property 
owners would be willing to agree to exactions that fail the logic and metrics of Nollan and 
Dolan, the Court’s efforts to protect property rights ultimately lead local governments to 
overregulate and diminish owners’ ability to develop their property.250
248
 To illustrate this dynamic, consider the facts of Nollan. The Court held that the Coastal Commission could not 
permissibly require the lateral beach easement, but noted in dicta that the Commission could permissibly deny the 
application or require dedication of a public viewing spot.  (Whether such a viewing spot would pass constitutional 
muster under Dolan’s proportionality test is a separate issue.)  Assume (as is in fact likely) that the viewing spot, 
located at the front of the property and inviting the public to peer beside or over the house to the beach, is more 
burdensome and intrusive to the property owners, and less appealing to the community, than the beach easement.  If 
the Commission fears that by even suggesting the beach easement it will be liable for a constitutional challenge, it is 
more likely to deny the permit, leaving both parties worse off.  See Kayden, supra note 244, at 47-48; Dana, supra 
note 13, at 1277-82 (providing examples that demonstrate the potential inefficiency of nexus and proportionality); 
Fennell, supra note 13, at 31. Although Dolan’s quantitative metric might provide protection for property owners, 
Nollan has blocked mutually beneficial bargaining by imposing a qualitative logic.
249 See Dahlstrom, supra note 200, at 568.
250
 This is not to say that open-ended bargaining for concessions will necessarily result in more effective regulation.  
Assume, for example, that the Court removed Nollan’s qualitative limits but retained Dolan’s quantitative metric, 
and thereby enabled more free-wheeling bargaining to ensue over concessions.  The resulting bargains, and judicial 
review of those results, may be unable to consider the extent to which an exaction is equivalent to the required 
mitigation.  That is, once bargaining is freed from any connection to the harms of the new development, neither the 
property owner nor the municipality and its citizens—especially those most subject to the proposed development’s 
harms—may be able to estimate the fairness of a bargain.  See Fennell, supra note 13, at 32 n.123 (arguing that 
nexus and rough proportionality must be linked because “[t]he nexus requirement keeps the bargaining chips in a 
common metric so that they can be counted, while rough proportionality requires that the chips be tallied up with at 
least rough accuracy”); cf. id. at 32 n.122 (positing that Nollan by itself might actually provide sufficient protection 
to property owners while enabling sufficient flexibility and range of possible exactions to encourage mutually 
beneficial bargaining); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of 
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 916 (noting the value of a Nollan-based germaneness requirement in checking 
excessive federal administrative arm-twisting).
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C. Result 3: No Effect, Due to Non-Compliance.
Finally, in some instances and in some jurisdictions, bargains may simply take place 
outside the constitutional parameters set by Nollan and Dolan.  Local governments may be 
willing to risk litigation in order to impose exactions that exceed constitutional limitations.  This 
is a likely result when there is strong political will for strict land use regulation.  It will also 
occur when a local government and a property owner sufficiently trust each other and the benefit 
of the approval or development agreement is sufficient for the property owner to bear an 
exaction that may be unconnected to, or may cost more than, the harms the proposed land use 
would create.251  It may be easier and faster for the property owner simply to agree to the 
exaction in order to receive the offered entitlement.  In either instance, Nollan and Dolan will 
have failed to curb the over-regulation they were intended to stop. 
Sufficient trust is especially likely between parties that repeatedly transact business with 
each other.  “Repeat playing” developers who expect to interact again with the local government 
or hope to avoid a reputation of being litigious among local governments within a region are 
likely to be willing to waive their constitutional claims to obtain fast approvals and cultivate a 
long-term relationship with the local government.252 New entrants into a local or regional 
property development market may lack such an established relationship with regulators and, for 
that very reason, may not be offered non-compliant exactions. This dynamic would adversely 
affect the competitiveness of the local land development industry and the quality and price of 
products offered.  
251 See Frederik Jacobsen & Craig McHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:  
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 342, 348 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978); see 
also Ryan, supra note 37, at 367 (reporting interview with planner in Cincinnati who observed that “bargaining was 
driven underground” after Dolan into meetings with staff to negotiate mutually agreeable exactions).
252
 Dana, supra note 13, at 1294-99; cf. Crew, supra note 54, at 50-55 (noting potential for abuse of development 
agreements by developers who shut out competing property owners by purchasing vested rights).  
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* * *
Thus, even if we assume that Nollan and Dolan would successfully protect the most 
vulnerable small property owners (like the plaintiffs in those cases) from extortionate 
overregulation, the decisions fail to impose standard, universal protection sufficient to achieve 
the Court’s stated goals.  In too many of the likely scenarios in which governments impose 
exactions, Nollan and Dolan fail to protect or over-protect property rights and help cause 
inefficient and unfair regulation.  The Court’s effort to formalize judicial review and establish 
uniform protections leave property owners, existing residents, and insufficiently protected 
environmental resources vulnerable to regulatory approaches skewed in response to Nollan and 
Dolan.  The Court’s efforts will not necessarily improve the bottom lines and results of 
exactions, and may in some instances actually impede better, more flexible concessions.
V. Takings Formalism and the Narrowing of Local Governance and Property 
Relations.
Part IV considered the effects of Nollan and Dolan on the substantive exactions local 
governments impose.  This Part focuses on the decisions’ effects on how local governments 
consider and impose those exactions.  The Court’s strong emphasis on individual rights and 
secondary emphasis on utilitarian conceptions of regulatory efficiency fail to consider competing 
and conflicting conceptions of local government and property as requiring and enabling political 
and social relationships with others in a broader community.253  Takings formalism and 
regulatory formulas limit the political ground upon which affected parties activate democratic 
institutions and processes by voicing their claims, and frustrates the role that the social 
embeddedness of property ownership plays in establishing community and a sense of social 
253
 A useful introduction to conceptions of property as political and social relations is Stephen R. Munzer, Property 
as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY  36 (Stephen R. Munzer 
ed., 2001)
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propriety.  As inherently political and administrative means of flexibly resolving land use 
disputes, exactions offer especially promising means of enabling legitimate and effective means 
of responding to proposed development.
This Part elaborates on what is lost as a result of takings formalism and regulatory 
formulas by focusing on land use’s place within local politics and on exactions an open-ended, 
flexible means of achieving a political and administrative compromise to the disputes that arise 
over development.  Although some communities might choose rights-based and utilitarian 
approaches to resolve development issues, others might choose otherwise and be better served by 
seeking more inclusive means of debating and collectively resolving land use disputes than 
through regulatory formulas.  But the Court’s rule-like command puts communities that would 
prefer more open-ended political and negotiated processes at risk of liability for compensation if 
their resulting exactions fail to meet Nollan and Dolan’s criteria.  
A. Takings Formalism, Political Contest, and Land Use Decision-Making.
In Nollan and Dolan, the Court limited the judiciary’s role in reviewing challenged 
exactions to evaluating the extent of an exaction’s precision.  Absent from the Court’s logic and 
metrics is any consideration of the political and social context of the bargain, the fairness and 
openness of the proceedings leading to the exaction, or the long-term relationship among 
community members.254  Put another way, the Court has made it constitutionally irrelevant 
whether the political process by which the concession and entitlement were derived and 
exchanged was fair or open to the concerns of all affected parties—all that matters, ultimately, is 
254 See Dagan, supra note 157, 774-78; Michelman, supra note 109, at 1248.  Both of these elements—context and 
relationship—would be considered under the Penn Central’s test consideration of whether the regulation relates to 
“promotion of the general welfare” and provides an “average reciprocity of advantage” to all affected property 
owners.  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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whether the resulting bargain meets the Court’s logic and metrics.255  Accordingly, those 
regulatory means of meeting the constitutionally required logic and metrics—preconstituted 
formulas that either avoid or are more likely to meet Nollan and Dolan’s tests—are inevitably 
safer and more attractive for local governments than an open-ended political contest with 
attendant political compromises.
The Court has thereby chosen to ignore the extent to which open-ended land use 
regulatory processes may enable a more robust, legitimate, and inclusive local politics, one that 
may yield substantively better resolutions to complicated and intractable local disputes than 
abstract, preconstituted formulas.256  Local land use conflicts, and decisions about the 
distribution of land use entitlements and the costs of development, are inherently and deeply 
political.  As such, democratic decision-making may not only be helpful or beneficial, but 
necessary for a functional community.  When decision-making processes enable the inclusion, 
debate, and compromise of fundamentally opposed positions within the complicated matrix of 
personal, social, environmental, and fiscal issues central to local government, they play an 
important function in identifying and allowing contest over issues of local importance.257  In 
255
 State law may impose procedural due process requirements that affected parties be afforded notice and 
opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-12 (requiring notice to neighboring property owners of 
public hearings concerning certain planning and zoning decisions); Horn v. County of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1141 
(Cal. 1979) (applying federal due process standards to evaluate adequacy of notice to adjoining landowners); see 
also J.R. Kemper, Construction Application of Statute or Ordinance Provisions Requiring Notice as Prerequisite to 
Granting Variance or Exception to Zoning Requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167 (1971).
256 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 5-6 (2000) (“The normative legitimacy of a democratic 
decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes 
and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.”).
257
 On the values of local participatory democracy at the municipal level, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1070-72 (1980).  In this context, I use “local” to refer not merely to the physical 
boundaries of cities, but to the more complicated communities that exist in neighborhoods within cities in 
relationships between cities and suburbs in a larger metropolitan region.  Jurisdictional governments make land use 
decisions, but when the terms of and debate about those decisions are constitutionally and administratively limited 
by cases like Nollan and Dolan, they are more likely to exclude the concerns of smaller and larger social units 
within and across a single jurisdiction.  See Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 
470-72 (2001).
65
allowing political contest, they may increase the loyalty of residents who would consider 
themselves part of a responsive and open political community.258
An exactions process that avoids the inevitably political questions about trade-offs 
between property owners and the community merely frustrates citizens’ desires to become more 
involved in land use decisions, thereby contributing to a sense of disillusionment and 
demoralization regarding public life.259  This frustration may develop among neighbors and 
environmentalists opposed to a project, as well as among property owners and developers who 
would prefer to engage in political horse-trading and creative bargaining through exactions rather 
than face outright denials of development rights.  When political participation in land use 
decisions is defined by the demand that decisionmakers deny a project because no negotiation is 
possible, limits on exactions as a political solution may lead disputants to overcommit to an 
absolute political position.260  As Albert Hirschman has noted, absolute political battles in which 
participants enter with an uncompromising dedication to a single issue tend to produce in the 
battles’ losers a sense of deep disappointment.261  And when government’s failure to consider 
and represent constituent concerns seems institutionalized, and the affective, financial, and time 
258 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 146, at 15-17.  Furthermore, if as part of their response to Nollan and Dolan all local 
governments within a region adopt relatively uniform, formulaic land use regimes, these jurisdictions’ sameness 
blunts the threat and promise of exit for the politically disenfranchised.  Id. at 124.  Local and regional governments 
that negate or blunt voice and exit especially constrain and frustrate political involvement and loyalty, Hirschman 
suggests.  Ideally, well-balanced regions provide not only opportunities for political dissent but, when voice is
ineffective, for the ability to exit to jurisdictions that offer distinct political, social, and cultural offerings.  Id. at 125.  
The proper mix of voice and exit creates loyalty among residents who are willing to trade the promise of exit for the 
uncertain possibilities of political change.  Id. at 77.
259 See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45, at 152-54.  The demoralization of existing residents represents the reverse 
scenario from that identified by Frank Michelman as one of the costs of land use regulation requiring consideration 
in finding a taking.  See Michelman, supra note 109, at 1214- 17; cf. Poirier, supra note 14, at 182 -83 (positing a 
notion of reverse demoralization of those adversely affected by a jurisdiction’s decision to maintain the status quo in 
response to property owners’ political and legal opposition to new regulation).  Michelman defined the 
“demoralization costs” that should be balanced to decide whether compensation is necessary as the total of the dollar 
value necessary to offset disutilities of losers and their sympathizers and the present value of lost future production 
from property owners and their sympathizers who change their behavior in reaction to the perceived unfairness 
caused by a regulatory act.  Id. at 1214.
260 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 119 (1982).
261 Id. at 104-05, 111.
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commitments community members make to the regulatory process bring forth no return to the 
community and to property owners, the resulting disappointment will lead to a retreat from 
public life.262  In this context, administrative efficiency substitutes for and suppresses political 
and social activity.
Disabling political contest over exactions thus also has wider effects on democratic 
politics.  Land use decisions are both an essential aspect of contemporary local American 
governance and an excellent opportunity for individual stakeholders to seek political and social 
involvement in an accessible set of institutions.263  Community members’ participation in the 
land use process at least demonstrates a level of engagement often lacking in contemporary 
federal and state politics.264  Land use politics is, in this sense, a gateway to political activism for 
environmental and property-rights activism, as well as for interest in larger political issues for 
the less active but still engaged participant.  Withdrawing or limiting exactions as an outlet for 
political debate and compromise may therefore affect not only the local issues surrounding a 
development project, but may also lead to wider disengagement from even the most lively and 
promising contemporary political forum.
The value of political contest and compromise over individualized, negotiated exactions 
lies in what Frank Michelman has called the “generative tension” between popular democratic 
rule and individual property ownership.265 Nollan and Dolan’s constitutional rule and 
262 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 260, at 79-80, 93, 102, 129.
263 See Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1057, 1075 
(1990).
264 See generally MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA 
SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 189-93, 240 (2002) (contrasting citizens’ disengagement with 
politics caused by centralized, institutional remedies to political problems, such as those used by the mainstream 
environmental movement, to political engagement in localized NIMBY and land use political battles); ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 344-46 (2000) (arguing that 
citizens’ civic engagement in land use disputes and responses by local government are likely to raise social capital).
265
 Michelman, supra note 236, at 1110.
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administrative consequences diminish this tension.  The Court’s narrow concern with abstract 
conceptions of prepolitical property rights—rights removed from the historical situatedness of 
political institutions and practices—insulate property from political decision-making and see 
political disputes over property rights as dangers to avoid rather than as an integrative process for 
democracy and individual rights.266  Formulaic quantification for its own sake—or to meet 
constitutional standards—may lead to a shaping of environmental and planning values based 
solely on that which can be quantified rather than on the interests of the community.267   The 
same is true for an equally narrow concern with allocative efficiency that instantiates as a 
primary regulatory model the pursuit of abstract utilitarian consequences, which are identified 
and measured by distant, rational experts.268
Political contest certainly is not immune to failure or unfairness.  In some contexts, 
democratic decision-making may be dangerous and inefficient.  Political decision-making 
266 NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 209-10; see also NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF 
POWER 112-13, 192-93 (1994) (contrasting decentralized local legal autonomy and discretion, which enable the 
construction of a locally specific sense of place, with legal and economic centralization of power within higher, non-
local levels of government, which are more likely to result in the construction of reproducible, homogenous space).
267 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV.
607 (2000).
268 See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 95-96 (2000); see also GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: 
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 22-23 (1999) (challenging the role of experts and an unelected 
bureaucracy making decisions essential to local democratic legitimacy and process); JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 4-5 (1993) (challenging role of 
technical experts as sole or primary decisionmakers in solving environmental problems); but cf. Charles M. Haar & 
Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158 (2002) 
(arguing for return to Progressive-era deference to expertise).
This critique of natural rights in property and utilitarian instrumentalism is analogous to critiques of 
deliberative democracy and communitarianism that, in Stanley Fish’s words, “replace large P Politics—the clash 
between fundamentally incompatible visions and agendas—with small p politics—the adjustment through 
procedural rules of small differences within a field from which the larger substantive differences have been 
banished.”  Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2255, 2298-99 (1997); see also MOUFFE, supra note 268, at 93 (criticizing communitarians’ “attempt at 
insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of value, this time by trying to fix once and for all the meaning 
and hierarchy of the central liberal-democratic values”); MARK REINHARDT, THE ART OF BEING FREE: TAKING 
LIBERTIES WITH TOCQUEVILLE, MARX, AND ARENDT 15-16 (1997) (criticizing communitarians for evading politics 
by deploying conceptions of the wholeness of a community to which all can and should belong to obscure the 
question of politics and power).
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processes may allow the eruption of intense conflict between factions and individuals that 
disrupts and even destroys existing social ties and networks.  Participants’ interests in disputes 
may be parochial, even inequitable and exclusionary.  But such conflict may itself be an 
important means by which a locality or region identifies especially significant issues it must face 
rather than suppress, and will thereby force decision-makers and interested parties to manage 
current and future disputes.269  And where dangerously or unfairly parochial, inequitable, and 
exclusionary interests prevail, judicial and state and federal legislative bodies have essential roles 
in correcting local political errors.
Nor does privileging political contest require excluding formulaic, instrumental methods 
where they are appropriate.  Such methods can solve specific disputes or aspects of disputes, 
especially in those instances when, within a specific political context, exactions would likely 
effect an extortion of an individual’s property rights or would result in insufficient internalization 
of development costs because of the capture of the decision-maker by development interests.  
Legislatively imposed exaction formulas also provide a level of cost certainty and administrative 
efficiency that individualized exactions and complex negotiations, by definition, do not.
Nevertheless, dispute is at the core of politics, and political contest is an important means 
to resolve that dispute where the local political context would allow the contest to take place 
fairly and inclusively.270  Formulaic exactions purged of individualized political dispute may 
protect property owners from the vicissitudes of increased political participation and power by a 
majority opposed to development, but their removal also eliminates the inclusion, contingency, 
269 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, Social Conflicts as Pillars of Market Societies, in A PROPENSITY TO SELF-
SUBVERSION 231, 241-43 (1995).
270 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 95, 123-24 (2002).
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and openness that might be found in the deal-making of political compromise.271  Politics 
“consists of practices of settlement and unsettlement, of disruption and administration, of 
extraordinary events or foundings and mundane maintenances”272—it consists, that is, of the ebb 
and flow of political dispute.273  To rely merely on formal rules and regulatory formulas is to lose 
the distinctive characteristic of local land use regulatory processes.  These processes include a 
“web of community understandings—sometimes highly idiosyncratic— about the way things 
ought to be done,”274 and are constituted as well by the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of local 
public life, which may attract or repel residents and should, assuming no abrupt changes in those 
particularities, allow those who are repelled to exit.275  Formulaic rules ultimately replace the 
educational and transformative capacity of law and politics within the social institutions of local 
government and local communities with the abstractions of numerical harms and costs.276  And 
they ultimately undervalue the creative possibilities of political compromise and overvalue a 
promised haven from democratic contest, unfairness, and inefficiencies through expertise and the 
judicial protection of pre-political rights.277
B. Takings Formalism and Local Dispute Resolution.
Exactions can play a mediating role in the land development process.  They can enable 
271 BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS 2-4 (1999);
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 146, at 15-17, 124.
272 BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 205 (1993); see also MOUFFE, supra
note 268, at 99-105 (advocating political institutions that enable a vibrant contest of democratic political positions 
that make room for dissent, do not guarantee particular results in advance, and invite a pluralism of voices).
273 See William E. Connolly, Politics and Vision, in DEMOCRACY AND VISION: SHELDON WOLIN AND THE 
VICISSITUDES OF THE POLITICAL 3, 15-16 (Aryeh Botwinick & William E. Connolly eds., 2001) (arguing against the 
control of “democratic spontaneity” by tight sets of “moral principles, constitutional rules, corporate dictates, or 
normative codes”).
274
 Rose, supra note 148, at 95.
275 Id. at 96-98, 101.
276
 Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1435, 1446 (2000) (reviewing 
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD (1999)).
277 F.R. ANKERSMIT, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 197-210 (2002).
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interested parties to trade entitlements in pursuit of mutually beneficial results, and help bring 
about community-based resolutions of contested land use disputes.  Indeed, individualized 
exactions’ value in allowing negotiated dispute resolutions is the necessary correlative to the 
political value of allowing dispute in land use decision-making.278  In her influential work on the 
“planning and dealing” of land use decisions, Carol Rose has argued that compromises arising 
out of the political contests described in the previous section play important roles within 
communities—they allow resolution of the disputes that arise when a property owner seeks to 
intensify the use of her land.  The bargaining over individualized exactions, she argues, is 
consistent with the open norms necessary to successful mediation.  It provides “an appropriate 
solution” that may not offer “a single answer complying with fixed standards, but rather a mix of 
accommodations.”279 Whether overseen by the local government, or by the judiciary,280 an ADR 
professional,281 or an independent local official,282 a negotiation process may be especially 
important and successful in local land use disputes where situated disputants have ongoing 
relationships and where a limited universe of interested parties might enable all or a majority to 
reach some form of consensus as to the terms of an agreement.283
278 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 269, at 243 (noting the significance of social conflict in requiring both bargaining 
and arguing in order to reach effective resolution).
279
 Rose, supra note 24, at 889-92.
280 See Hon. Richard S. Cohen et al., Settling Land Use Litigation While Protecting the Public Interest: Whose 
Lawsuit Is This Anyway? 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 844, 848-49 (1993) (advocating an active role for judges in 
overseeing negotiated settlements of land use litigation and protecting the public from agencies that may bargain 
away its duty to enforce existing law without fully explaining its motives in reaching the agreement during or after 
the process).
281
 On the development of institutionalized land use dispute resolution programs in state governments, universities, 
independent commissions, and private consultants, see LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION 
TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 24-25 (1999); Jonathan M. Davidson & 
Susan L. Trevarthen, Land Use Mediation: Another Smart Growth Alternative, 33 URB. LAW. 705 (2001).
282 See Ryan, supra note 37, at 386-88 (proposing a “third-party deputy” distinct from the property owner and 
decision-making authority to oversee mediation).
283 See WILLIAM FULTON, REACHING CONSENSUS IN LAND-USE NEGOTIATIONS 12 (American Planning Association 
Planning Advisory Service Report No. 417, 1989) (explaining that seemingly small disputes over land development 
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When the resolution to a land use conflict emerges from negotiation rather than from the 
administrative imposition of a legislated, predetermined formula, a decision to allow 
development can appear more legitimate.  The collective process by which the result was 
reached enables all sides ultimately to support, or at least not to block, the ultimate agreement to 
allow development.284  The resolution may also be substantively better to the extent that the sides 
are able to communicate information about the proposal as well as their concerns and interests to 
each other, either directly or through a third party, and thus come to some understanding of their 
respective needs and expectations.285  A negotiated resolution may also be more secure in the 
future.  When an unforeseen event or impact arises, a prior negotiated resolution among repeat 
players in a land use game with long-term relationships—such as developers, local governments, 
and political majorities—may better lend itself to inexpensive non-legal adjustments in a good 
faith effort to preserve an ongoing consensus.  By contrast, when new events or impacts call into 
question decisions that had been judicially or administratively imposed, landowners are more 
likely to consider the prior result as declaring a binding entitlement, and community-members 
are more like to litigate than to negotiate as a result.286 Negotiated solutions are also generally 
can escalate into large political struggles if they are inadequately or insufficiently resolved through negotiations 
among the parties).  
284
 Deakin, supra note 40, at 108; cf. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 110 (2000) (explaining “legitimacy benefit” of negotiated environmental 
rulemaking); Richard H. Cowart, Negotiating Exactions through Development Agreements, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 40, at 219, 231-32 (warning that development agreements may “insulat[e] 
development decisions from citizen review, opposition, or revocation” where governments and developers exclude 
citizen concerns from the negotiation and review process).
285 See KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 139; Freeman & Langbein, supra note 284, at 110-12; Christian Hunold & Iris 
Marion Young, Justice, Democracy, and Hazardous Siting, 46 POL. STUD. 82 (1998); cf. Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules 
for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 139 (1999) (arguing that “muddy” standards can lead to more efficient results 
by forcing parties to bargain with each other without the certainty as to which of them holds the legal entitlement).
286 KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 139 (citing Stewart Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963)).
72
less expensive and more amicable than litigation and administrative appeals over complicated 
and contentious legal and factual issues.287
This argument about administrative formulas is consistent with similar claims about the 
role of what Carol Rose has called the “muddy” and “crystal” rules in property law.288  For Rose, 
muddy rules (or standards) characterize a recurring tendency within doctrinal cycles to shift 
towards “fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision” and away from clear, crystal rules (only, at other 
times, to shift back again).289  A benefit of vague and open-ended mud rules, Rose argues, is 
their mimicry of negotiations and communication within long-term, situated relationships and a 
constituted community.290  And as such, according to Marc Poirier, the rhetorical and 
jurisprudential power of muddy rules’ vagueness arises from how it “allows and forces citizens 
to participate in societal discourse” and to consider the terms of any judicial, political, or 
administrative resolution in a manner that is fair to all parties concerned.291  Crystal rules—
whether imposed by the judiciary (as in Nollan and Dolan) or by legislatures and administrators 
(as in regulatory formulas for exactions)—may protect especially vulnerable individuals but are 
opposed to, and may inhibit, individualized and collective decision-making.
Negotiated land use decisionmaking and dispute resolution do not work under certain 
circumstances292 and may not in practice be as inclusive and participatory as they appear in 
287 See Wegner, supra note 29, at 960.
288 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
289 See id. at 578.
290 See id. at 602-03; see also Radin, supra note 12, at 270 (arguing that in deciding takings cases courts engage in 
“the pragmatic practice of situated judgment in light of both partial principles and the unique particularities of each 
case”).
291
 Poirier, supra note 14, at 190-91.
292 See SUSSKIND, supra note 281, at 23 (concluding, based on survey of participants in 100 communities that had 
engaged in negotiated settlements of land use disputes, that mediation does not work when, among other conditions, 
participants do not recognize the other side’s rights, the party providing financial support insists on controlling the 
mediation process, and one or more parties to the dispute are more interested in setting precedents for future legal or 
administrative disputes or are using the process to delay real action or to create an illusion that something is being 
done).
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theory.293  Certain communities at certain moments may lack the willingness, ability, and 
information to negotiate fairly, inclusively, and in good faith.  When this occurs, property owners 
or the larger community may agree, or be forced to agree, to an unfair or unwise compromise.   
Judicial review in such instances would impose a proper check on the resulting bargain and the 
process by which it was reached.   But to the extent that Nollan and Dolan and their 
consequences heighten the risk of takings liability for negotiated solutions and shrink the 
universe of potential negotiating points by limiting the scope and quantity of entitlements 
governments can require and accept, they may frustrate efforts to utilize bargaining and 
negotiation to mediate land use disputes within the specific context of the affected parties.294
Parallel to the wider political benefits of allowing greater political contest in land use 
decisions,295 enabling more negotiated settlements to those disputes has wider benefits to the 
social conception of property and property rights.  By enabling a community-based resolution to 
a political dispute over property rights, development, and impacts, exactions serve what Rose has 
described as the “propriety” version of the western conception of private property296 and what 
Laura Underkuffler has described as the historically significant “comprehensive” approach to 
property in American law.297  Rather than mere preference satisfaction or utilitarian 
consequentialism, the “proprietarian” version of property emphasizes responsibility and 
293 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS 13 (2000) (summarizing 
criticisms of detractors of assisted negotiation, including claims that negotiation is neither faster nor less expensive 
than traditional processes, fails to result in legitimate agreements and consensus, and ultimately ends in litigation 
anyway); Michelle Ryan, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Cases: Friend or Foe?, 10 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 397, 412-14 (1997) (summarizing arguments of ADR critics); Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning 
From the Failure of Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 253-54 (1994) (noting and theorizing about 
reasons for failure of Massachusetts law intended to aid in siting of locally undesirable land uses through required 
negotiation and dispute resolution).
294 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO 
RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 87 (1987) (noting importance of trading entitlements, rather than merely seeking 
compromise, in resolving disputes).
295 See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
296
 Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NOMOS 223 (1994).
297
 Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 133-42 (1990).
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trusteeship both by the property owner and the community within which the owner is socially 
located.  Rose finds in modern takings law’s flexible, ad hoc balancing of private loss and public 
benefit the echoes of this conception of property.298  And rather than an individualist conception 
of the exercise and realization of property rights, Underkuffler’s comprehensive approach 
conceptualizes property as including a “a broad range of human liberties understood within a 
collective context of both support and restraint.”299   Formalist and formulaic approaches to the 
law and to the administration of exactions frustrate this conception of property by substituting 
logics and metrics for the open-ended negotiations of situated, affected parties. 
Conclusion
If Justice Scalia’s suspicion that courts and local governments are knowingly and widely 
disobeying the Court’s takings rules is valid; and if local governments, property owners, and/ or 
third parties are dissatisfied with an increasingly formalized and formulaic development process; 
and if the systematic under- and overregulation of land use has led in some areas to 
environmental and infrastructural regulation and in other areas to underutilization of developable 
land, then, this Article has argued, the culprit may be Nollan and Dolan’s takings formalism.  
Protecting individual property owners from the vagaries of political majorities and regulatory 
transitions is clearly an essential purpose of contemporary judicial review under the Takings 
Clause.  But the excessive leverage that Nollan and Dolan’s protective commands provide for all 
property owners—which protect them even, in some instances, from bargains they would 
298 See Rose, supra note 296, at 239-40.  Others have made similar arguments about the dual nature of American 
conceptions of property.  See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997); Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBS. 157, 208-09 (1994); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991); Joseph 
L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1981) (describing property as “an 
interdependent network of competing uses” and rejecting conception of individual parcels and rights as “a number 
of independent and isolated entities”).
299
 Underkuffler, supra note 297, at 140-41; see also ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 35-48 (1987) (describing the mixture 
of private ownership and public control in modern conceptions of liberty).
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willingly make—not only demonstrates the commands’ overinclusivity, but also threatens the 
political, social, environmental, and economic benefits that land use regulation and local 
government offer.  Takings rules seek to limit the unruly, particularistic, politicized sites of land 
use law.  As a general matter, judicial and administrative noncompliance and frustration with 
essential nexus and rough proportionality requirements is not caused by the systematic resistance 
of ideological courts and local governments.  Rather, this noncompliance and frustration 
demonstrates the complicated dynamics of locality operating in the shadows of takings 
formalism.
